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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Soviet Union**

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***Military Thought***

No 3, March 1990

# Soviet Union

## MILITARY THOUGHT

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## MILITARY THOUGHT

No 3, March 1990

### From Draft of "CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress"

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[Unattributed item]

[Text] **Defense.** Our new thinking significantly expanded the capability of ensuring the security of the country by political means, but we need reliable defensive capability as long as the world is militarized and fraught with armed conflicts and military danger has not been removed.

The party considers it its duty to see to it that our Army and Navy, which have done such great services for the Motherland, can successfully accomplish the missions facing them under present-day conditions. For this it is necessary to take matters to **military reform** based on the new defensive doctrine and the principle of reasonable sufficiency. Inasmuch as military organizational development is oriented toward qualitative indicators, it is necessary to increase the professionalism of cadre personnel in every way and elevate the code of honor of those who have linked their destiny with the Army to a level worthy of our Army's grand traditions. The party will strive to increase the prestige of military service, strengthen social protection and improve everyday conditions for servicemen and their families.

## TOWARD THE 28TH CPSU CONGRESS!

### Master Political Leadership Methods\*

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No 3, Mar 90 (signed to press 28 Feb 90) pp 3-12—FOR  
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[Article by Admiral of the Fleet A. I. Sorokin]

[Text] The renewal of Soviet society along the paths of democratization of all its political institutions insistently places questions on the agenda connected with the CPSU's activity in the present stage of perestroika. The Party's functions and role in society are being given a new interpretation and its coordinates in socialism's political system are being determined.

Having acted as the initiator and chief motive force of transformations in the country and the guarantor of the revolutionary process, the Party also must restructure its own activity. This is possible only under the sign of a restoration of the Leninist concept of the Party as a genuine vanguard of society, an increase in the importance of its elected entities, democratization of all its structures, and mastery of political methods of leadership.

Political methods consist of a close relationship with the masses; natural, lively and constant work with people; an ability to listen to and speak with a person about what is most important and urgent; democratization; broad glasnost and openness in all matters; and use of opinions and suggestions of the officer public in developing administrative decisions. Mastering these methods is absolutely necessary in the changed conditions of Party activity, although this is considerably more complicated and difficult than that administration by injunction, by decree and by command, which is inherent to the arm-chair-bureaucratic work style in which people rely on pressure and the force of an order in everything.

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The turn toward political methods of leadership in the activity of Army and Navy political entities is accompanied by a rebirth of the principle of active party-political support of combat and mobilization readiness and of the training of Army and Navy forces, as well as by a shift in the center of gravity of all work to a specific person. This is the principal, priority basis in the work of political and Party officials at all levels. It stems integrally from the 19th All-Union Party Conference line about reorienting Soviet military organizational-development toward qualitative parameters.

In outlining anew the functions of political entities in giving political support to all Army and Navy activities, it must be noted that potentially they possess great organizing, mobilizing and upbringing capabilities. Being Party leadership entities, political entities *first of all* are part of the Party structure and *secondly* they are invested with corresponding administrative-political functions and are included in the system of military command and control entities. Such a combination of Party and administrative-political functions permits political entities to use not only Party, but also administrative powers in the interests of the job.

But when the CPSU assumes the role of society's political vanguard and state administration shifts more and more to the Soviets, we have the right to pose the question of how justified the *unification* of the functions of Party leadership and administrative-political into a *single* element such as the political directorates and departments is. This is even more important under conditions where voices are being heard about eliminating the political organs and replacing them with party committees.

In responding to this question it is necessary to proceed from the fundamental theses that if the Army is intended for the armed defense of the country, then all organizational structures of the Soviet Armed Forces, including those connected with performing party-political work, must serve to increase the mobility of Army and Navy forces and their readiness to operate in a military situation. All experience of Party organizational-development in the Army and Navy in peacetime, in the Civil and Great Patriotic wars, as well as in local armed conflicts

shows that where political entities simultaneously combine political-administrative and Party functions, results also are considerably more effective there. But the presence of Party committees alone in the Army cannot ensure necessary promptness in accomplishing the combat missions at hand, since in contrast to the Deputy Commander for Political Affairs and the Chief of the Political Organization, the Party Committee Secretary does not have the right to decide matters administratively.

History persuades us that the question of establishing and strengthening the Red Army Party-political apparatus is rooted in those *fundamental Leninist theses* which became the basis of Soviet military organizational-development. The principal ones were the following: the Red Army was created as a tool of the Soviet state based on soldiers' conscientious attitude toward the job of defending workers' interests. A socialist state could build such an Army only under the leadership of the Communist Party, the leading and guiding force of Soviet society which reflects the people's fundamental interests and performs political upbringing of the masses.

V. I. Lenin viewed party-political work as a most important Party function, one of the chief directions of Party leadership of the Republic Armed Forces. The leader of the revolution repeatedly telegraphed to Front Revolutionary Military Councils: "Keep an eye on political work..."; and "Don't let up on political work..." At that time the Political Departments acted as a strictly administrative-political apparatus, while the Party Committees performed the work of political organizations. And although political organizations and Party Committees tried to act in coordination in delineating their duties, they did not always succeed in doing so: there were cases of duplication which considerably hampered the organization of political influence on soldiers. Therefore, in late 1918 the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Central Committee abolished Party Committees at Lenin's initiative, making the Political Departments responsible for the tasks they were performing. Since then **the principle of combining the functions of Party leadership organizations and administrative-political organizations has been the basis of the Political Departments and Directorates.**

A deviation from that principle was the authoritarian, pressure-oriented, command-administrative work method and style of the leaders of establishments, which introduced serious deformations to the principles and standards of Party life and to the work of Army and Navy Political Organizations. Underestimation of their role led to the reorganization in June of 1940 of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and Workers' and Peasants' Red Navy Political Directorates as the Main Political Propaganda Directorates, with corresponding functions and powers given to them. These changes introduced disorganization and nervousness into the work of political organizations and diverted their efforts away from accomplishing fundamental questions of

strengthening the Army and Navy to a campaign against imaginary "enemies of the people" right in the period of a growing threat of war stemming from fascist Germany. The need for an organizational restructuring of the political organizations and a search for those forms and methods of their activity which would best contribute to strengthening the troops' morale was again realized only with an expansion in the scale and scope of Party-political work in the Army and Navy under conditions of failures of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War.

**Unfortunately, the years of stagnation could not help but leave their imprint on Party-political work and on the activity of political organizations.** Elements of formalism, conservatism, inertia, self-complacency and indifference appeared in the style of some of them. Authoritarian methods affecting above all people's will rather than their feelings or reason became more familiar for these political organizations in working with people. Such methods also predominated in exercising leadership over party organizations, depriving them of independence and creativity to a considerable extent. On the one hand, a controller's administrative approach and substitution for corresponding commanders and officers in charge began to show up noticeably in the work of the Party-political apparatus, and this was not always done consistently and competently. On the other hand, some political officials themselves often were not working to outstrip events, but followed the lead of events.

Perestroika activated Party-political work and required the taking of a fresh look at the functions of political organizations and Party Organizations. Analyzing the work of the Belorussian Military District Political Directorate in February 1989, the Bureau of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy carefully examined progress in fulfilling guidelines of the 19th All-Union Party Conference about its mastery of political methods of leadership. It was noted that the Political Directorate had set a firm course toward perestroika and toward a consistent rejection of administrative-pressure methods of leadership, and this was opening up an expanse for Party members' initiative and creativeness. Primary efforts were being concentrated above all on organizational work directly in political organizations and Party Organizations and on training cadres and the aktiv. Nonstandard forms of lively contact between Party member/leaders and the people are being established, and political studies and political-upbringing work are being diversified. Problems of the democratization of the internal life of Party Organizations and strengthening ties with the masses are being advanced to the foreground in the leadership of Party Organizations by political organizations.

However, a subsequent study of the local state of affairs showed that efforts to implement these measures are not always being linked with a profound interpretation of the theoretical base and with the essence and practical realization of political methods of leadership, above all in the primary political entity. As a result it is here that



Party-political influence on the quality of performing combat missions facing Army and Navy forces often abates.

Considering all this, for the first time in many years the Main Political Directorate assembled the Chiefs of Primary Political Organizations for collective consultation about how they can more effectively head the process of a growth in public activeness of Army and Navy personnel and elevate their own role as an entity of political leadership. Everyone who took part in it arrived at the conviction that mastering the art of organizational and upbringing work with people in the specific situation of a military and labor collective today comprises the heart of political leadership and determines success of the irreversibility of perestroika. In their work political organizations must enter into a dialogue with people more often; win their trust; carry people along after them by force of conviction, arguments and personal example; and not rely on orders and instructions, but skillfully combine Party and administrative-political principles.

**Political methods are the basis of the Leninist methodology of Party leadership.** They can be defined in the most general form as a set of appropriate techniques and means directed above all toward a person's awareness and inner motives of behavior and subordinated to implementing the policy of the Communist Party and Soviet state in the USSR Armed Forces.

In order to carry out political leadership most effectively, each political entity must have a so-called appropriate political appearance. This is reflected *first of all* in its striving to organize its internal life and leadership activity most fully on a democratic basis, with very strict observance of Soviet laws and military regulations. In practice, however, examples sometimes are encountered where the political entity's internal life is subordinated to the will of the first person.

**Political methods of leadership presume proper placement of cadres in all sectors and an ability to excite people's curiosity and persuade and unite them to accomplish assigned tasks.** For this it is necessary to regenerate an atmosphere of openness, genuine collectiveness, free expression of opinions, wide discussion of all urgent questions of policy and practical activity, conscious discipline and personal responsibility in each political entity as well as in the Party as a whole.

Figuratively speaking, if we are able to impregnate the internal life of political organizations and Party organizations with a spirit of democracy and if conditions are created for a fearless comparison of views, this also will not be slow in exerting a positive effect on the life of military collectives.

*Secondly*, the political appearance of the political entity is reflected in its capability to sensitively perceive the full gamut of opinions in military collectives and promptly react to changing sentiments in it. This requires lively, informal contact with the soldier masses and with public organizations and movements. Do not command, do not

impose one's opinion, but build relationships on principles of political trust while calling on all active, creative forces for implementing Party policy in the sphere of defense and national security.

It is also necessary to improve Party leadership of Komsomol and trade union organizations, giving support by one's involvement and lending a positive ideological-moral coloration to amateur associations and clubs of the Army youth, to the soldiers' honor council and to other mass public organizations and movements.

In this connection it is impossible not to notice that positive impetus given perestroika in the Army and Navy by the *Officer Conferences* held in units and aboard ships from 15 November through 5 December 1989. Their results demonstrated that an improvement in the moral-ethical atmosphere was beginning to show in the majority of officer collectives. Criteria were developed for evaluating each officer's personal activity, professional, methods and cultural level, and practical contribution to perestroika. Officers fervently supported the very idea of such a meeting and, based on broad democratization and a comprehensive consideration of their collective opinion, delegated their best representatives to the *All-Service Officer Conference*, which was held for the first time in the history of the Soviet Armed Forces and took place in Moscow during 7-8 December 1989. It constituted the birth of a democratic mechanism for social protection of servicemen and gave it the status of a consultative entity in all practical matters troubling officers and members of their families.

**It is important for political organizations to work in close contact with Deputies of local Soviets and with USSR People's Deputies**, behind whom stand hundreds of thousands of electors and leading public organizations. The majority of Deputies are Party members and their intellectual potential and authority are needed for resolving the very acute problems facing the Soviet Armed Forces. There are 82 servicemen alone among the USSR People's Deputies. All of them are consolidated in the *Armed Forces Deputy's Group*, at whose regular sessions opinions on perestroika in the Army and Navy are exchanged and deputies' positions are revealed on very important issues of defense organizational-development.

**The ability to work with representatives of informal organizations demands special attention.** Today tens of thousands of politicized informal groups and organizations are functioning in the country, often with an antisocial (and sometimes also an antisoviet) direction. It is inadmissible to underestimate all this; to the contrary, it is necessary to use the entire arsenal of educational and legal means for influencing representatives of informal associations called into the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces.

*Thirdly*, speaking of the political appearance of political organizations, we proceed from the assumption that the Party is at the people's service and consequently is under

their constant supervision. Soviet history has known the practice introduced by Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) decree in 1921 of political organizations giving accounts at Party Conferences. Unfortunately, this was eliminated in the 1930's. Now this tradition has been revived and political organizations not only give accounts at Party conferences, but they also receive a corresponding evaluation of their work. Further development of glasnost, establishment of democracy, and a quest for ways of improving their accountability to the Party masses are needed in the work of political organizations.

**Political leadership presumes above all the ability of political organizations to constantly keep the organization of execution of Party resolutions and the development of high responsibility in command-political cadres and the Party aktiv for implementing policy in the sphere of the defense of the country and its security in their field of view.** This is their chief obligation, spelled out by the Statute on Political Organizations. The success of political leadership and Party work lies in practical accomplishment of the tasks of improving combat training and strengthening discipline. Those direct results which a political entity works to introduce to the development of soldiers' political awareness and official and public influence are the chief criterion in evaluating political influence.

Based on common tasks and directive guidelines, it is necessary for every political entity and every Party organization to have its own *program* which meets specific conditions of actions and which promotes attainment of real objectives in matters of raising qualitative indicators of combat readiness and training of Army and Navy forces, raising efficiency, and strengthening military discipline.

In implementing the demands of modern military doctrine and in substituting an intensive path of augmenting defense capability for the extensive path, we turn more and more today to the individual himself, to a growth in his professionalism, and to his evolution of a developed defense awareness and readiness for defense of the socialist homeland based on ideas of new political thinking.

Meanwhile it is impossible not to see that against the background of the relaxation of tension in the world, a reduction in the Soviet Armed Forces, and their *perestroika* on the basis of the strictly defensive direction of USSR military doctrine, discussions over the Army's role in society and principles of its organization and development are not subsiding and criticism is heard that is not always constructive touching on the foundations of vital activities of entire military collectives. This engenders pacifist sentiments among young men in the draft contingent, weakens and reduces soldiers' official activeness, and generates demobilization sentiments in them. A clear contradiction is apparent here. On the one hand, the individual's role and the level of his defense awareness increases repeatedly under conditions of

implementation of new military doctrine and, on the other hand, the conditions in which defense awareness is shaped do not always correspond to the Party's demands for Army and Navy readiness. To see, to understand and to analyze what is occurring, *to faultlessly find approaches to each specific person, and to skillfully motivate him for attaining high results in combat training—here is where the art of political leadership lies today.*

**Life insistently advances the need for political organizations to develop a systems approach to political support of combat-training activities of Army and Navy forces.** It must be based on an explanation to Army and Navy personnel of the CPSU Central Committee's concern over serious shortcomings in performance of alert duty and combat patrol duty and in combat training, and over the status of military discipline—shortcomings which undermine the Soviet people's faith in reliability of protection of their peaceful creative labor. It must also be based on a decisive struggle against instances of falsified accounts and lack of objectivity in assessing the results of combat training; execution of firings, missile launches and bombings; and difficult missions of maritime deployments.

There can be no secondary matters when it is a question of political support to combat training. Let us take, for example, the dependence of high combat readiness on the level of servicemen's social protection and their material welfare. How does a particular officer or warrant officer live? What kind of everyday conditions does he have? Does he have a roof over his head at all? How is his morale? Today these and other questions must become the key ones for political organizations, since it is possible to arrive at a high and, most important, a stable level of combat readiness through how people feel and through their awareness, and not the other way around. It is this approach that must be the basis of work with members of servicemen's families and with garrison women's councils, whose role has grown considerably of late.

The sphere of everyday life is not only a social, but also a political issue. Everyone must deal with it, but this sphere is a priority for political organizations. The Party, Supreme Soviet and government have been taking serious steps lately under the difficult financial and economic conditions which have formed in the country to improve servicemen's material welfare and social conditions. Questions involving concern for Soviet Armed Forces organizational-development, for increasing their authority and for strengthening servicemen's social protection were the focus of attention of the Main Military Council of the USSR Defense Council, a session of which was held for the first time in long years on 18 October 1989 under the leadership of M. S. Gorbachev.

**The need to renew ideological work and make it the most important direction of political organizations' activity is a necessary condition for a transition to political methods of leadership.** Here it is necessary to understand right away

that *ideological work is not being set off against Party-organizational work*. It is a matter of not minimizing it and not putting it "in the position of a handmaiden to current affairs," as M. S. Gorbachev emphasized at the Conference in the CPSU Central Committee on 18 July 1989. Ideological work not backed up by organizational work is essentially barren and empty, while a political entity's organizational activity, without ideological support, is blind. It was Lenin who noted that "organization devoid of principles and ideals is nonsense." We obviously have to proceed from this when we speak of *the correlation of ideological and organizational work*.

Considering the new concept of ideological activity, it is necessary to dwell on two fundamental points which were heard at the All-Service Conference of Ideological Officials in September 1989.

*First.* Relying on methodological principles of Marxism-Leninism and provisions of CPSU documents of the last five-year period on the essence and characteristic features of the new Leninist concept of socialism, not only our creative scientific forces, but also political organizations and Party organizations can and must productively nourish ideological work with new ideas and generalizations helping to accomplish more successfully the practical tasks of training and educating Army and Navy personnel. This is especially urgent now, when politicization of the masses and a differentiation of opinions are strengthening and when a specific contingent of young people has appeared in military collectives who previously participated in informal associations, mass meetings and strikes and who have been infected with ethnic egotism and a striving for cliquishness.

At the present time it is impossible to speak about political methods of leadership while depreciating and underestimating that portion of ideological work which must actively generalize Party-political practice, obtain new knowledge about its laws and principles and about their manifestation and observance, and thereby nourish ideological upbringing activity and the political and organizational work of political organs and Party Organizations.

*Second.* It is a matter of the practical aspect of activity to improve political leadership over processes of renewing ideological work, to enrich its content and ideological-theoretical level, to strengthen ties with life, and to eradicate formalism and wearisomely edifying sentiments. Today, when an interest in the socialist homeland's history is especially noticeable in young soldiers and their desire grows to comprehend the path covered by the country and understand how their grandfathers and fathers lived and how the heroic and tragic were combined in life, it is the duty of political organs and Party organizations to shift military-patriotic upbringing to a qualitatively new basis, making maximum use of close ties with local Party and soviet organizations and the veteran public for this purpose. Preparations for the 45th anniversary of the Great Victory, which have unfolded in the country, must play a major role here.

Unfortunately, one often has occasion to encounter instances where the importance of ideological work is recognized in words, but in fact one still finds Chiefs of Political Organizations who are not always able to organize a dialogue or effectively agitate and propagandize. The poor professional preparedness of regular ideological officials, some of whom do not have an academic education or higher military training, frequently tells.

Such a discrepancy between tasks of ideological work and the actual attitude toward it now is being seriously reconsidered. The question of establishing special subunits in certain military educational institutions where it would be possible to prepare professional propagandists also is being studied. Training programs are being changed, with priorities in them being given to social sciences, which will comprise over 60 percent of the entire academic load. It is important that the significance of this work be understood in all political organs and Party Organizations and that appropriate measures be taken to correct the state of affairs in this sector.

Renewing the content of ideological work is inconceivable today without fundamentally improving political training and the entire system of ideological-political upbringing of personnel and activating the work of commissions, councils, the institution of Deputy Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations for ideological work, and the large detachment of irregular ideological subunits and the aktiv.

In the new political situation (characterized by broad democratism, people's social activeness and a diversity of opinions), political organizations must make a serious turn away from coercion to persuasion, away from appeals, orders and peremptory shouts to proof, away from various kinds of dogmatism to a profound study and analysis of sociopolitical processes in military collectives. The Social and Psychological Problems Research Center, recently established under the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, actively serves these objectives. Here social scientists and practical workers not only study problem-oriented issues among the troops and in the fleets, but also generalize various proposals of political organizations for strengthening the effectiveness of political work and activating the human factor.

**Mastery of political methods of leadership is linked inseparably with an increase in the role of primary organizations and an enrichment of their activity as the political nucleus of military collectives.** In the article entitled "The Socialist Idea and Revolutionary Perestroika," M. S. Gorbachev emphasizes that "the CPSU exerts its influence on processes occurring in society by many-sided practical work among the masses, acting through Party Organizations and Party members."<sup>1</sup>

In the present stage many political organizations are taking a new approach to determining basic directions in



the activity of each primary organization with consideration of specific conditions and the tasks it is accomplishing, delving more deeply into processes of intra-Party life, getting rid of fruitless inspections and methods of paper and telephone leadership of their activity, and reducing the flow of instructions and the number of various conferences.

Only through Party organizations can political organizations turn their political and Party potential into practical affairs. Therefore, there must be no more important matter for them than leadership of Party Organizations, many of which still await help from above out of habit, complain about a shortage of guidance instructions, and show no independence.

In relations with Party Organizations, on the one hand political organizations must reject the stereotype of the "pointing finger," and on the other hand they must emancipate their activity and provide more opportunities for displaying initiative and independence. It is important to persistently perfect the style and methods of work of Party Committees and Bureaus as collective leadership organizations and display daily concern for broadening the *aktiv* and for involving all Party members in political work among the masses. Acting through Party organizations and through Party members, each political entity must become an organizing and integrating Party entity in the direct sense of these words.

Staff Party Organizations require the most fixed attention, since like no one else, Party members of staffs (Chiefs and Directorate Officers) need the ability to conduct lively work with people. The personal example of high-quality labor and high morality, closeness to subordinates and paternal concern for their service and everyday life, the culture of contact with people, and the ability to mobilize to attain high end results must become the criterion of their vanguard role.

Only on the basis of social unity and a commonality of interests and objectives of all elements of the troop organism—political organizations, commanders, staffs and directorates—joined by the bonds of Party comradeship is success possible in performing the major important jobs facing military collectives. At the same time, the question of a division of functions of political organizations and commanders, staffs and rear organizations also is competent. It is a question of concretizing and delineating various methods of achieving objectives of common work and of precisely determining responsibility for a particular sector of activity.

Take for example the personnel's *political-moral state*. While a commander provides a healthy moral climate through organization of the entire tenor of service, strict observance of military regulations, combat and political training, and everyday life, the Party-political apparatus does so by means of lively, daily ideological work with people, purposeful influence on servicemen's awareness and will, and the shaping of close-knit multi-ethnic collectives.

It is also the very same in questions of strengthening *discipline*. The task of Party-political work is to help the soldier perceive the full importance of and need for military discipline and to develop habits of self-discipline. It is the job of commanders and staff officers to arm soldiers with this knowledge and these skills and to arrange service and everyday life in strict conformity with the regulations.

Strengthening sole command [*edinonachaliye*] on a Party basis and democratization of sociopolitical life and mutual relations in military collectives are two inseparable tasks. Fundamentally new points have appeared in the relationships of the Commander and Political Deputy: as CPSU members, both are fully accountable to the Party organization. That is how matters have been arranged throughout the Party and in all Party organizations.

The full set of difficult questions involving a reinterpretation of the role of political organizations and Party organizations and their transition to political methods of work under conditions of democratization is determined to a decisive extent by how personnel policy is conducted. Much has been done lately to block the path against protectionism. To this end permanent efficiency report boards have been established and, as we noted, a new democratic institution, the Officers' Conference, has begun work. A more democratic procedure for officers to perform service is envisaged. Meanwhile the state of affairs in cadres policy obligates political organizations and Party organizations to show more concern for ideological-theoretical conditioning of officers at all levels, to check their job qualities in practical matters, and to influence selection and placement more objectively through democratic mechanisms. In this important and responsible work it is important to rely on Party members who are on the permanent efficiency report boards. During the reduction in the USSR Armed Forces cadres matters must be considered under the unremitting attention of political organizations and Party organizations. It is impossible to put an end to the formal-questionnaire, nomenclature approach to cadres work and to authoritarianism and arbitrary decisions without the concerned personal involvement of chiefs of political organizations and secretaries of Party committees and bureaus and without their democratic sentiment.

It is also necessary to fill out the corps of the political apparatus itself and the Party *aktiv* with creative forces and make way for Party members who are capable of activating the work of Party organizations and ensuring success of *perestroyka*. Assignment of personnel not only vertically, but also laterally and bold introduction of the principle of alternativeness must become the rule.

Here is one other aspect of this problem. The turn toward political methods of leadership does not clear the agenda of political organizations' concern for seeing that the Party-political apparatus persistently masters military affairs. It is not by chance that this matter is given a major place in the curricula of educational institutions.

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This process must be continuous, since broad military-technical horizons and detailed special knowledge and experience permit the political officer to conduct Party-political work with soldiers and educate them more objectively and purposefully.

Extensive work of preparing for the 28th CPSU Congress and the 120th anniversary of Lenin's birth has unfolded in the Party and the country. There is now no more important task for each political organ and for Party members than to elevate the authority of the Party of Lenin, which depends to a considerable extent on its ties with people and on the exemplariness of its members.

An understanding by Army and Navy Party members of their role and place in perestroika and of the need for a specific, purposeful, businesslike and highly moral influence on the soldier masses by political leadership methods, and creation of conditions obligating everyone to work in a new way, in a Leninist way, is the guarantee of effective Party-political support of the Soviet state's sufficient and unquestionably reliable defensive might and of an increase in Army and Navy combat readiness.

#### Footnotes

\*The article is recommended for use in the system of Marxist-Leninist training for officers and generals.

1. PRAVDA, 26 November 1989.

## FOR THE 45TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GREAT VICTORY

### Repulse of Fascist Aggression: Lessons and Conclusions

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pp 13-22—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Colonel A. D. Borshchov, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] The orientation of Soviet defense organizational-development primarily on qualitative parameters advances new demands for further development of military theory and practice. As V. I. Lenin pointed out, however, "we cannot learn to accomplish our missions with new tactics today if yesterday's experience did not open our eyes to the incorrectness of the old tactics" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], Vol 44, p 205). The purpose of this article is to analyze the experience of carrying out basic operational measures for preparing troops of western border military districts to repel the fascist aggression on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, focusing the readers' attention on those of its lessons which in our view are most current even at the present time.

According to military-doctrinal lines of the 1930's, the Soviet Union was not pursuing aggressive goals and consequently could not be the initiator in unleashing

war. The idea of a crushing retaliatory blow was the basis of views on employing the USSR Armed Forces in war in defence of the achievements of socialism. Its essence was that in case of an external attack, troops of border military districts had to be ready for immediate retaliatory operations to decisively defeat the aggressor and to shift military operations onto his territory. While giving priority to the offensive in repelling an enemy attack, military theory also did not reject the possibility of assuming the defense. M.N. Tukhachevskiy noted that it was impossible to exclude the possibility of defensive operations even under the most favorable conditions of the onset of war.<sup>1</sup>

Existing experience was comprehensively considered in the course of elaborating the concept of the initial period of war. It was noted in particular that *each new war as a rule posed not only complicated and completely unexpected problems, but also demanded nonstandard approaches to their resolution*. From this it was concluded that the initial period of war "must be correctly evaluated back in peacetime and one must properly prepare for it."<sup>2</sup>

In forecasting the possible nature of combat operations, Soviet military science took account of the so-called trend toward "creeping into war" which began to appear in the 1930's. It was emphasized here that possible imperialist wars *would no longer be officially declared as was the case in August 1914*. Soviet military theorist and historian V. A. Melikov wrote: "People will creep" into war with the principal thought of using *a surprise attack* to disrupt the enemy mobilization and to wreck his plans for concentration and deployment."<sup>3</sup> The continuous growth in capabilities of the probable enemy's armed forces, especially his aviation and tank forces, which permitted not only disrupting, but also wrecking the other side's concentration and deployment, also received attention. "New means of warfare," Chief of Staff of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army A. I. Yegorov noted in theses submitted to the USSR Revolutionary Military Council in 1932, "pose questions of the initial period of war in a new way."<sup>4</sup> In this connection it was suggested that, in contrast to World War I, a future war would develop into a fierce engagement with great spatial scope from the very first hours, and the first operations would have "not a secondary, but a very important and responsible significance."<sup>5</sup>

Prewar theoretical elaborations formulated principles of creating groups of covering forces and expressed practical recommendations on their makeup and training. Tukhachevskiy wrote that border engagements would be waged not by the main body as previously was the case, but by special force groupings deployed at the state border. He also pointed out that units of tank troops and aviation were to be their basis. It was prescribed that formations and units of border military districts be maintained under tables of organization and equipment close to those of wartime and that during mobilization they carry out additional conscription from areas no more than 10 km from permanent disposition areas.<sup>6</sup>



One other provision of prewar theory which we believe to be instructive draws attention. Based on the fact that in past wars not one plan "was *wholly and fully* implemented and carried out in the initial period as the general staffs assumed in peacetime," it was insistently recommended that all planning documents concerning troop activities in the beginning of war be exceptionally flexible, i.e., capable of "purposefully and quickly perceiving what was occurring and restructuring many matters *on the move*."<sup>7</sup>

And so theoretical views on the initial period of a future war had been worked out. On the whole they correctly took account of the military-political situation forming in the world, the level of development of armaments and military equipment, the capabilities and intentions of the probable enemy, experience of initiation of past wars and other factors. Meanwhile they also had shortcomings, the principal one being that these views had not been properly systematized. Existing in the form of individual statements by political figures and military leaders and in the form of thoughts in the periodical press, they were not the property of the bulk of Soviet Armed Forces command personnel. Moreover, many works by theorists and practitioners of military affairs, who had been subjected to groundless repressions, were seen as "hostile" by the beginning of the 1940's. All this had a negative effect on practical measures of preparing to repel fascist aggression.

**Planning for covering the state border** was completed in the General Staff in early May 1941. For the defense of the USSR's western borders the deployment of four fronts based on the Leningrad, Baltic Special, Western Special and Kiev Special Military Districts was envisaged. It was planned to constitute the 9th Army from Odessa Military District forces. By the middle of May the districts were assigned the following missions: to prevent an invasion both of the ground and air adversary; to cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of troops by a stubborn defense along the line of the state border; to determine the concentration and grouping of enemy forces in a timely manner by all types of reconnaissance; to seize air supremacy by aggressive air operations and disrupt and delay enemy concentration and deployment by powerful strikes against main railroad bridges and interchanges as well as against his force groupings; to ensure normal operation of railroads and concentration of troops by operations of air defense weapons and aviation; and to prevent the insertion and landing on district territory of airborne assault forces and raiding parties.<sup>8</sup> As we see, *clearly defensive* missions were specified for the districts.

Plans drawn up by the district staffs assigned forward security areas to armies, sectors to corps and subsectors to divisions. In our view, the latter was superfluous. Excessive centralization of planning, reflected in the detailing of missions to two-three levels lower, shackled the initiative of the local command authority, which had better knowledge of the situation and terrain conditions.

It was planned to deploy combined-arms armies in the first echelons of districts or fronts. In the areas allocated each of them was to organize a covering-force area, which, along with the army makeup of formations and units, included additionally the garrisons of fortified areas and the NKVD border troops at the beginning of war. The mission of the armies consisted of preventing an enemy breakthrough in zones from 80 to 160 km wide. The extent of a border sector covered by an army reached 150-200 km or more with consideration of its configuration.

The plans provided that should the enemy penetrate the defense of the first echelon armies, he would be engaged by antitank artillery brigades and aviation subordinate to the front commander. By destroying the tanks, they were to create conditions for the forward movement and deployment of mechanized corps. The primary mission of the latter consisted of delivering powerful flanking and concentric counterthrusts, which were planned only in general terms. The planning was reflected in a determination of the makeup of counterthrust groupings and probable axes of their operations to restore a lost position. Rifle Corps from district reserves were directed to occupy defensive lines at a depth up to 100-150 km in readiness to repel the enemy who had broken through.

As a rule, Army-level plans for covering the state border were elaborated under a common scheme and duplicated District plans to a considerable extent. Rifle divisions assigned to the Army first echelon were assigned missions of covering a border sector stretching from 25-30 to 70 km, and on rugged terrain up to 120-150 km. If the Army had a mechanized corps in its makeup, the latter was the basis of the Army reserve and was earmarked for delivering the Army's counterthrust.

On the whole, planning for covering the state border corresponded to the theoretical concept of the initial period of war which had formed and contained many sensible decisions. Its basis was the stubborn holding of fortified areas and field fortification structures as well as the *aggressive* nature of conducting the defense. It was proposed to use counterattacks and counterthrusts against enemy attempts to penetrate the defense. The massive use of mechanized corps and forces of aviation and antitank artillery brigades was envisaged for these purposes. If favorable conditions shaped up in the period of repulsing the aggression, all defending forces of the border military districts were oriented toward launching a counteroffensive (by direction of the High Command), the objective of which was final defeat of the enemy force groupings which had invaded.

But the planning also had substantial shortcomings. Plans figured only on the presence of a threat period, but there were no provisions for options of placing troops in combat readiness in advance in case of a surprise enemy attack, as military theory presumed, i.e., these documents specifically lacked that *flexibility* for which military scientists had repeatedly pointed out a need. Noting these and other miscalculations, Marshal of the Soviet

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Union G. K. Zhukov wrote: "Features of the initial period of modern war essentially were not fully taken into account in the revision of operations plans in the spring of 1941. The People's Commissar for Defense and the General Staff believed that war between such large powers as Germany and the Soviet Union should begin according to the scheme which existed previously: the main bodies engage several days after the border forces. With respect to time periods of concentration and deployment, fascist Germany was placed in identical conditions with us. In fact, however, both the forces and the conditions were far from equal."<sup>9</sup>

Planning also was not distinguished by *realistic concepts*. A considerable portion of the troops intended for covering the state border did not yet exist. For example, the 13th Army and the 14th Mechanized Corps of the Western Special Military District were in the activation stage. The 100th Rifle Division, which was to arrive only for the mobilization reserve, was included in the covering-force area of the district's 4th Army.<sup>10</sup> District and Army-level plans did not provide for a deep alignment of the defense or lengthy defensive operations. Inaccuracies in estimating options of the probable enemy offensive were a typical shortcoming of many of them. For example, in the Kiev Special Military District the 6th Army plan did not account for the possibility of an enemy attack against the boundary with 5th Army, as actually happened.

The obvious fact of a *belated rehearsal of plans*—they had not been approved in the districts and armies by the beginning of the war—is also noteworthy. Plans for providing cover were not gotten to those immediately responsible for execution, since they were continuously being changed and updated. Marshal of the Soviet Union K. K. Rokossovskiy recalled that on the eve of the war: "a kind of lull reigned and no information came from above.... In any case, if there was some plan, it clearly did not correspond to the situation which had taken shape by the beginning of the war, which resulted in our troops' serious defeat in the initial period of war."<sup>11</sup>

A number of practical measures for reinforcing the troops of border military districts were carried out under conditions of an aggravation of the situation on the USSR's western border during May-June 1941. A partial covert mobilization was conducted under the guise of military training courses, which permitted bringing the strength of rifle divisions up to 9,000-14,000 persons. Fortified area garrisons, district and army air force units, artillery, engineer troops, signal troops, air defense troops, rear units and establishments as well as staffs were partially augmented. A vast set of measures was carried out to reinforce NKVD border troops, thanks to which the density of tactical security per kilometer of border sector more than tripled.<sup>12</sup> But motor transport and horses from the national economy were coming to the troops in very limited numbers. Because of this, many formations and units continued to be unable to provide for normal troop supply or to fully move the artillery and other materiel. For example, two out of three battalions in the

howitzer artillery regiment of the 85th Rifle Division, 3rd Army, Western Special Military District did not have tractors, and the 113th Rifle Division, 10th Army of this same district had only seven instead of the 69 tractors authorized under the TO&E.<sup>13</sup> A halfway policy in conducting mobilization measures did not permit resolving problems of increasing the combat readiness of border military district forces as the situation required.

Simultaneously, there were redeployments of forces within districts. Some formations stationed in the interior began to be drawn up closer to areas earmarked for defense. The measures taken were useful on the whole, but in our view it was erroneous not to take effective steps to deploy first echelon divisions and place them in full combat readiness. Moreover, any initiative in this direction was stopped abruptly, though there also were exceptions.

For example, General of the Army G. N. Mikushev, Commander of the 41st Rifle Division, 6th Army, acted in a bold and original manner. In view of the obvious signs that aggression was being prepared, he began to assemble units in the division camp on his own initiative back on 17 June 1941. On 21 June the subunits were issued everything that would be taken in a combat alert under the guise of preparing to conduct militarized competitions set for Sunday, 22 June. General Mikushev oriented unit commanders on a possible enemy attack and ordered the officers to remain in the subunits over the next night. As a result, by the end of 21 June the division essentially had been placed in full combat readiness in advance and covertly by the so-called *administrative method* without moving into assigned areas. Assembling its units in one area deprived the enemy of an opportunity to disrupt command and control and communications, which he succeeded in doing in the majority of other sectors. Steps taken by General Mikushev ensured the division's organized entry into battle, while district forces on the whole proved unprepared to repel the enemy attack. It was a similar situation in other military districts as well.

The composition of border military district forces and their groupings were determined by the importance of the operational axis being covered. The Kiev Special Military District, in whose zone the Soviet military-political leadership erroneously expected the enemy's main attack, had the strongest force grouping. The decision to concentrate the main efforts of the forces of the Western and Kiev special military districts in the Belostok and Lvov salients, from which it was planned to deliver artillery attacks, also seems inadvisable to us. Experience showed that there were serious flaws in the defensive-offensive force groupings of the border military districts established by the beginning of the war. The basic flaw was that *offensive force groupings were being formed to the detriment of executing missions of reliably defending the state border*. And this, we will note, was when the Military Councils of the Baltic, Western and Kiev Special Military Districts possessed rather precise information by May-June 1941 about the concentration of

enemy forces and the nature of his possible operations, as convincingly attested by archival documents.<sup>14</sup>

By the beginning of the war covering armies each had 80,000-100,000 persons, 900-1,500 guns and mortars of 76-mm and higher caliber, 900 tanks and 100-140 aircraft. This supported the establishment of the following operational densities: approximately 20 km per division and 8-10 guns and mortars and 4-5 tanks per kilometer of front, which was 2-3 times lower than provided by prewar views. It was believed, however, that such densities would be sufficient with the defense resting on permanent structures of fortified areas, and would provide the necessary stability with a decisive concentration of personnel and equipment on the threatened sectors, but most often the personnel and equipment were distributed evenly and by the beginning of the war the construction of fortified areas had not been completed.

The enemy achieved a considerable superiority on the chosen axes. For example, the Army Group Center offensive force grouping surpassed 4th Army by more than 4.5 times in personnel, by almost double in tanks, and by 3.5 times in guns and mortars. The superiority of the enemy first operational echelon's forces over the first echelon formations of the covering armies was especially great. For example, four enemy infantry divisions and three panzer divisions deployed opposite 128th Rifle Division, 11th Army, Baltic Special Military District. Eight enemy divisions were opposed by the 87th and 124th rifle divisions of 5th Army.

**Serious miscalculations were committed in the stationing and upkeep of border military district forces.** In disposing and stationing formations and units along the new state border, people usually were guided not by operational considerations, but by the presence of barracks and spaces suitable for troop living and working conditions. Formations of 4th Army were stationed especially poorly. The 42nd Rifle, 6th Rifle and 22nd Tank divisions were stationed in the Brest area in the immediate vicinity of the border. According to plan, at the beginning of a war rifle division units essentially were to move forward along the border, the 42nd to the northwest and the 6th to the southwest over a distance of up to 75 km. With the introduction of the plan for covering the border, the 22nd Tank Division had the mission of moving forward to the northeast, cutting across the movement route of 6th Rifle Division units as well as across two main rail lines and one main highway. Such redeployments had a negative effect in the very first hours of the past war.

And they are especially dangerous under present-day conditions, characterized by the presence in NATO armies with powerful precision nuclear and conventional weapon systems. In this connection it appears important to thoroughly evaluate and consider past experience, including negative experience, in the course of the present and planned withdrawal of formations and units from groups of forces.

**In our view, on the eve of war M. N. Tukhachevskiy's conclusions that formations and units of covering armies must be maintained under TO&E's close to those of wartime also were not fully taken into account.**<sup>15</sup>

In reality, by 22 June rifle formations had been brought up only to 65-80 percent strength. They were disposed at permanent garrison locations or in training centers, while one rifle battalion from each first echelon regiment was moved right up to the state border. Artillery was in camps at scheduled training courses at a considerable distance from their formations. Things were no better with the manning and upkeep of mechanized corps. Their combat equipment, basically obsolete models, was standing in motor pools, usually mothballed. Formations were supplied with one unit of fire of ammunition and one of fuel. The other stores were kept at army and district depots, located for the most part not far from the state border.

**Front and army aviation on the territory of border military districts also was being maintained with major deficiencies.** With the norm of three airfields per regiment with an authorized strength of 63 aircraft, often up to 100 aircraft or more were accommodated at one airfield. The aircraft inventory consisted of approximately 80 percent obsolete equipment, around 13 percent of which was in an unserviceable condition. Only 15 percent of the flight crews had been trained for combat operations under adverse weather conditions. Combat readiness of border military district air defense forces also was characterized by a low level.

**There were substantial shortcomings in accomplishing missions of engineer preparation of defensive zones and covering-force areas.** Excessive concentration of attention on constructing fortified areas along the new state border led to a reduction in combat readiness of such areas along the old border line and to a diversion of forces from creating field fortifications on the territories of border military districts.<sup>16</sup>

**Omissions in the training of command personnel, staffs and troops played more than a minor role in the unsuccessful outcome of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War.** It should be noted that operational and combat training generally bore a planned, purposeful character on the eve of the war. Individual questions of theory and practice of the beginning of war were raised at conferences and courses of Soviet Armed Forces leadership personnel and they were worked out in operational-strategic games and tactical exercises. Serious shortcomings in planning for covering the state border and in troop training often were revealed in the course of measures that were conducted, but correct conclusions were not always drawn from this.

For example, conferences and exercises revealed an underestimation of capabilities of the probable enemy's aviation to disrupt mobilization and deployment of the forces of border military districts and insufficient consideration of the experience of its employment in the



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first operations of World War II, but no practical steps were taken to remedy these deficiencies. Unobjective estimates of ground force capabilities were also permitted. For example, General D.G. Pavlov, Commander of the Western Special Military District, noted that we had the right and were obligated to assign missions to the mechanized corps to destroy one or two enemy tank divisions or four or five enemy infantry divisions, and General K.A. Meretskov, Chief of the General Staff, tried to convince people that our division was considerably stronger than the fascist German Army division and in the defense it would repel an attack by two or three of its divisions.<sup>17</sup>

The experience of exercises in border military districts showed that their priority was given more often to rehearsing questions of the offensive. General L.M. Sandalov, former 4th Army Chief of Staff, attests that conditionalities and oversimplifications were allowed in exercises on a defensive theme: systems of trenches and connecting passages were not created, but only denoted. Minefields were not laid and problems of organizing a defense with the involvement of tank units were not mastered.<sup>18</sup> There were major miscalculations in training rifle formations and fortified areas for joint defensive operations. For example, the 41st Rifle Division, 6th Army and the Rava Russkaya Fortified Area, intended for covering a common 50 km sector of the border, did not conduct a single joint exercise during 1940-1941.<sup>19</sup>

In examining questions of training border military district troops to repel fascist aggression, one cannot help but note the negative role played by the familiar TASS announcement of 14 June 1941. Despite having a certain political significance, it disoriented military cadres and weakened their readiness to repel enemy invasion. The fact is that some of the political education and agitation-propaganda measures conducted in this connection had a negative effect; they exerted, not a mobilizing, but a calming and corrupting influence on personnel. Confirmation of this is the work of a group of officers from the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army Main Political Directorate headed by Army Commissar 2nd Rank V. N. Borisov among Baltic Special Military District forces. On the evening of 21 June 1941, i.e., at that very time when enemy troops who had poised for the attack were being read Hitler's appeal about the campaign to the East,<sup>20</sup> representatives of this group at meetings in 11th Army units were persistently explaining that there would be no war and that all talk about its possibility bore nothing more than a provocative nature.<sup>21</sup> Consequently what we have are facts of a gap between theory and practice, between words and practical affairs. Such a situation, which played a negative role in the past, appears to be no less pernicious at the present time.

And so numerous measures were being taken in the center and locally on the eve of the Great Patriotic War to prepare for repelling fascist aggression, but border military districts did not succeed in carrying them out to the full extent and with high quality. Miscalculations and

errors, which had both an objective as well as a subjective character and which are obvious today also occurred in the conduct of preparatory measures. This was clearly manifested in the course and outcome of Soviet forces' defensive operations in the initial period of war and predetermined the difficult conditions of the development of subsequent events at the Soviet-German front.

An analysis of the content of prewar theoretical views on the initial period of war and of experience in carrying out a set of practical measures for realizing them in western border military districts provides grounds to note a number of what we view as *instructive lessons*.

**First.** The failures of 1941 above all are the result of distortions in defense policy on the part of the country's supreme military-political leadership, I.V. Stalin's subjectivism and monopoly in choosing the means and methods of achieving objectives, and the ignoring of that scientific store which had been accumulated in the 1930's. Therefore, fulfillment of all defense programs under present-day conditions, and especially measures for preparing to repulse a possible external attack *must be based on a scientifically grounded theoretical concept and be conducted on a purposeful, planned basis without any conditionalities or manifestations of subjectivism and dogmatism.* This conclusion also wholly conforms to 19th All-Union CPSU Conference lines on strengthening the ties of science and practice.<sup>22</sup>

**Second.** Experience teaches that in the stage of planning to cover the state border and the first defensive operations it is important to comprehensively consider the full set of economic, sociopolitical and strictly military conditions of the situation. USSR Minister of Defense Army General D. T. Yazov notes: "The Soviet Union is forced to prepare for whatever war an aggressor prepares."<sup>23</sup> In this connection the intensifying danger of a surprise attack by a probable enemy who is taking steps to outfit his armed forces with fundamentally new models of weapons and military equipment merits special attention today.

It is also important to emphasize that operational plans of border military districts and groups of forces for conducting the first defensive operations must provide for several options of troop operations depending on possible conditions of the aggressor's initiation of war.

**Third.** Its essence is that *combat documents being drawn up under peacetime conditions must be sufficiently specific and simultaneously flexible* and permit necessary corrections to be made in the course of a war which has begun, and the command authority and personnel of the covering forces should be oriented, not toward the automatic triggering of documents, but toward actions in conformity with the existing operational-strategic situation. The consequences resulting from fascist Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, a surprise for border military district forces, insistently demand that the USSR Armed Forces be kept in such a condition as to ensure their organized entry into a war even in a more complicated

situation than the one which took shape by the morning of 22 June 1941. The efforts of command personnel, political entities and staffs at all levels must be directed toward this above all back in peacetime. In our view, those forces earmarked for disrupting an aggressor's invasion, conducting the first defensive operations and delivering retaliatory attacks and surprise retaliatory counterstrikes against him should be kept in the highest state of readiness. Given past experience, *troops of border military districts and groups of forces must be capable of executing their assigned combat missions without additional redeployments and reorganizations, i.e., essentially at any moment*.

**Fourth.** *Advance preparation of theaters of military operations is an important direction for increasing the readiness of covering forces for repelling a possible invasion by a ground enemy. The extent and nature of engineer preparation of installations and the terrain must conform fully to combat missions assigned to those forces stationed in border areas. Past experience teaches that in support of the covering forces' first commitment, it is important to take a substantiated approach to determining the correlation of the distance from the border of defensive lines and positions, lines of operational and other obstacles, deployment lines of counterthrust force groupings, and so on, on one hand, and the distance of the disposition areas and the locations of corresponding units on the other hand.*

**Fifth.** Operational and combat training as well as political upbringing and agitation-propaganda work in the covering formations and units must aim personnel above all at ensuring execution of the primary mission—*maintaining troops and command and control entities at the level of the threat of the onset of war and reacting promptly to all changes in the probable enemy's plans and intentions.* Experience also indicates that with an aggressor's surprise initiation of war, demands increase sharply for autonomy of operations by formations, units and subunits. This obviously can be achieved without great outlays *by stationing them in the same locations and areas with planned means of reinforcement and support and by active joint drills, practices and exercises.*

**Sixth.** It is common knowledge that in preparing for war, the fascist German command concentrated its invasion forces in advance and under other various pretexts at the Soviet border. That operating method from the probable enemy's arsenals cannot be ruled out even now. A series of exercises held in NATO Armed Forces simultaneously in a vast territory from the Barents Sea to the Mediterranean during August-September 1989 is clear proof of this. Such exercises are dangerous in that they are not always subject to unequivocal qualification and are difficult to distinguish from an actual deployment of forces for war. And in order not to repeat past mistakes, the question of the possibility and advisability of granting commanders of formations stationed on territories of border military districts and groups of forces and having missions of covering the state border *the right of independently taking adequate steps when the*

*enemy conducts measures for increasing his forces' combat readiness* requires very careful study under present-day conditions. First of all, this will permit reducing the probability of an aggressor's surprise attack; secondly, it will facilitate keeping forces in an appropriate state of readiness to repel possible invasion.

And finally the **seventh** lesson from past experience. It is that everything previously accumulated must not be taken unequivocally and transferred to modern conditions in its initial form. As a matter of fact, attempts in 1941 to canonize the experience of the initial period of World War I revealed its total groundlessness, as Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov admitted.<sup>24</sup> Consequently, in our view even today the reminder that *any past experience requires continuous creative study and practical application only with consideration of the entire set of changes which have occurred since the war and which are occurring now* will not be superfluous even today. In other words, at the present time we should take an identically weighed approach both to conclusions drawn based on the experience of preparing border military district forces to repel fascist aggression on the eve of the Great Patriotic War as well as to assessments of the modern military-political situation with consideration of changes in the means and methods of warfare.

#### Footnotes

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## OPERATIONAL ART

### Positional and Maneuver Operations: Role and Place in the Defensive Operation

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[Article by Major-General A. S. Kulikov and Major-General A. D. Nefedov]

[Text] Views on dividing the defense into static and maneuver underwent certain changes in the theory of the Soviet military art in different periods of its development. Both forms of defense were recognized in prewar years, but in postwar years the opinion predominated that there was no need for this. Lately the viewpoint that such a division is justified has become sufficiently firmly established.

What are the reasons for the change in views? What aspects of the development of the theory and practice of the defense lie behind this? In what instances in a modern defensive operation is it preferable to use a particular form of defense and when is their combination advisable? This is far from a complete list of questions connected with the problem posed in the article. The authors, students of the USSR Armed Forces' Military Academy of the General Staff, express their opinions on a number of them.

In beginning consideration of the problem posed in the article, it is our view that we should dwell, however briefly, on a reinterpretation of the attitude toward defense in the theory of the Soviet military art. Thus, in accordance with prewar views, it was believed that it would be conducted as a rule by army large strategic formations in three instances: on a secondary axis for economy of forces in support of the offensive force grouping; on the main axis to consolidate success achieved in the course of an offensive and to gain time for preparing a new offensive; and to weaken the enemy force grouping (if possible) by defensive operations before launching an offensive. *On the whole the defense was considered a secondary form of combat operations.* Meanwhile, its division into positional (fixed) and maneuverable (mobile) was allowed depending on the objectives and methods of its conduct. A positional defense was considered the main form and its objective was to inflict defeat on a superior enemy and create conditions for launching an offensive or counteroffensive by stubbornly holding terrain prepared in the engineer sense. In addition to inflicting damage on the enemy, the objective of a maneuver defense was to gain time and conserve one's personnel and equipment. The possibility of losing a certain portion of territory was not precluded, i.e., methods close to delaying actions with individual elements of a withdrawal held a significant place in the content of troop defensive operations.

After the Great Patriotic War the defense began to be considered the basic form of combat operations after the offensive. It was assumed that defensive operations were possible only in those cases where an offensive was inadvisable or impracticable and it was necessary to ensure its successful conduct on other important axes or to gain time. The fact that operational-tactical nuclear missile weapons became the principal weapon in operations conducted by troops of branches of the Armed Forces was a fundamentally new provision of the operational art. It was believed that under these conditions defensive engagements of fronts and armies must be built on a combination of rigidly held defended lines and troop maneuver operations. Their objective was to prevent an enemy incursion and create conditions for launching an offensive or counteroffensive. It was deemed inadvisable to divide defense into positional and maneuver, which was substantiated by the change in the character and content of defensive operations in which troops who were dispersed laterally and in depth were to occupy the most important areas on individual sectors. It was planned to support the gaps arising here

by the fire of missile troops, by air operations and by obstacles with wide use of natural obstacles.

Giving military doctrine an unequivocally defensive direction determined the status of defense as the principal form of combat operations [deystviy], especially in conducting the first defensive operations [operatsiy]. Its objective is to repel the aggressor's incursion, inflict defeat on him and restore the lost position. The principal condition for achieving this is a concentration of efforts on the most probable axes of the enemy's delivery of attacks, with the creation of a firm positional defense on them. But a weakening of other sectors is inevitable here, and can be grounds for conducting a maneuver defense on them. In our opinion, the great likelihood of a surprise initiation of aggression as well as an attacker's delivery of strikes to the full depth of the defender's operational alignment not only by weapons, but also by airmobile and airborne formations and units, also should be viewed as such grounds.

Dividing the defense into positional and maneuver also involves changes in the views on the sequential conduct of the defensive operation. According to prewar theory, three zones prepared with engineering works were established for this: a forward operations zone of obstacles 25-50 km deep (in the absence of contact with the enemy); a tactical defensive zone 20-30 km deep; and an operational defensive zone of approximately the same depth. The beginning of active pressure on the enemy on the approaches to the main zone by air and long-range artillery strikes was considered one of the important conditions for achieving the objectives of the defensive operation. Forward detachments and then subunits assigned to combat security would be committed with the enemy's move into the security area.

It was planned to inflict considerable damage on the attacker in the struggle for the tactical defensive zone. This zone was considered the most important; an army's main efforts were concentrated in it and the fate of the operation as a whole depended on its stability. Preparation of the main and secondary line of the defense was envisaged in addition to the security area. Extensive use of maneuver was proposed along with rigid positional warfare. It must be noted that the effectiveness of combat operations in the tactical zone was reduced considerably, however, since establishment of a developed system of trenches was not envisaged. Because of this the troops' concealed disposition and their protection against artillery fire and air strikes were not ensured; additionally, the maneuver of subunits also was hampered. The weakness of antitank defense also had a negative effect on stability of the tactical defensive zone, which was established along lines (battalion, regimental, divisional) with a clearly insufficient density of antitank weapons (6-9 guns per kilometer with echelonment to a depth of 2-3 km).

The operational [operativnaya] defensive zone included the zone of maneuver of army reserves and the army rear boundary. It was expected that here the weakened enemy would come under a powerful flank attack by army reserves and units redeployed from sectors not under attack, which

would be a precondition for his final defeat. It was recommended also using a portion of front reserves for this same purpose. Thus it was presumed that the operation would represent a set of successive defensive engagements in corresponding defensive zones.

The Great Patriotic War considerably altered prewar views on the theory and practice of defense. To put this in the most generalized form, theoretical provisions relative to a maneuver defense on an operational scale essentially were not realized in defensive operations.

With respect to positional defense, probably only in defensive operations on the near approaches to Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad were its inherent features manifested to an ever greater extent in the actions of fronts and armies. What we mean is that more and more it assumed forms which one can say were defined as classic by the end of the war. The principle "not a step backward" became one of the basic principles in organizing a defense, but its introduction did not at all presume only rigidly holding occupied positions. A skilled combination of positional and maneuver forms of warfare (Table 1) becomes a deciding condition for successfully achieving the objectives of defensive operations. Thus, being the principal factor determining aggressiveness of the defense, the maneuver at the same time was one of the most important ways of making it insurmountable.

Table 1—Selected Data on the Number of Forces Involved in Maneuver in the Kursk and Balaton Defensive Operations\*

Formations, Units	Voronezh Front		3rd Ukrainian Front	
	In the Front	Involved in a Maneuver	In the Front	Involved in a Maneuver
Rifle divisions	35	12	43**	24
Motorized rifle brigades	3	3	2	1
Mechanized brigades	3	3	3	3
Tank brigades	20	18	7	4

\*"Sovetskaya Voennoye Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol. 1, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1976, p. 372, "Kurskaya bitva" [The Battle of Kursk], Moscow, Nauka, 1970, p. 316, "Voennoye iskustvo vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne i v poslevoyennyy period" [Military Art in World War II and in the Postwar Period], Moscow, 1986, p. 281, "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna: 1941—1945. Entsiklopediya" [Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 Encyclopedia], Moscow, Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1985, pp. 445, 707.

\*\*Including six Bulgarian infantry divisions

An improvement in stability of the defense also followed other paths. There was an increase in the depth of alignment of positions and lines. For example, the depth of an army defense in the 1941 summer-fall campaign was 15-20 km, by the end of the first period of war it was already 25-30 km, and in the second and third periods it was 30-40 km. There was an increase in the numbers of personnel and equipment assigned to various elements of the operational alignment and in their echelonment (Table 2)

Table 2—Makeup of Elements of Army Operational Formation\*

Periods of the War	First Echelon	Second Echelon	Combined-Arms Reserve	Tank Reserve	Antitank Reserve	Mobile Obstacle Detachment
In 1941 summer-fall campaign	3-4 rifle divisions	Rifle division	Up to a rifle brigade	Up to a rifle brigade	Antitank artillery regiment	-
By end of first period	3-5 rifle divisions	1-2 rifle divisions	Up to rifle division	Up to tank brigade	1-2 antitank artillery regiments	1-2 combat engineer companies
By end of second period	2-3 rifle corps	Up to rifle corps	1-2 rifle divisions	Up to 2 tank brigades	1-2 antitank artillery brigades	2-3 combat engineer battalions
By end of third period	2-3 rifle corps	Rifle corps	1-2 rifle divisions	Tank corps	2-4 antitank artillery brigades	3-4 combat engineer battalions

\* "Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva" [History of the Military Art], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1984, Diagram 60

Firepower increased in repelling assaults and against a penetrating enemy. For example, while the rifle division of the TO&E approved in July 1941 had the following fire capabilities: weight of artillery volley 348 kg, weight of mortar volley 348 kg, number of rounds per minute from small arms and machineguns 141,000; in the divisional TO&E approved in December 1942 they already comprised: weight of artillery volley 460 kg, weight of mortar volley 640 kg, number of rounds from small arms and machineguns 205,000 per minute. There was a simultaneous increase in average densities of personnel and equipment (Table 3). As a result, the depth of effective fire on the enemy by rifle division personnel and equipment increased from 3-5 km (in the first period of the war) to 6-8 km (in the third period), and that of the rifle corps rose from 12-15 km to 15-20 km respectively.

Table 3—Mean Operational Densities of Personnel and Equipment in the Army Defense Zone (per km of front)\*

War Periods	Guns and Mortars	Tanks and Self-Propelled Guns**	Antitank Guns
In 1941 summer-fall campaign	5-6	1-3	1-3
By end of first period	16-27	6-7	3-5
By end of second period	30-80	7-27	20-25
By end of third period	50-70	7-20	25-30

\* "Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva" [History of the Military Art], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1984, Diagram 60

\*\* Self-propelled guns entered the inventory in 1943

Cover of positions and lines in the defense became deeper both by troops and by engineer obstacles. There were increased densities of antitank weapons and of minefields laid in the course of a battle because of the maneuver of antitank reserves and mobile obstacle detachments. There was increased capability to mass fire on enemy axes of main attack and increased effectiveness of counterpreparation, which lasted 30 minutes in the Battle of Kursk. Well reconnoitered enemy artillery batteries were primary targets for destruction in the

Central Front zone, and personnel and tanks concentrated at the point of departure for the offensive were such in the Voronezh Front.

Engineer preparation of a defensive area improved. In the 1941 summer-fall campaign the tactical defensive zone included only a main zone 3-5 km deep, representing a position equipped with squad emplacements within the system of platoon, company and battalion strongpoints and defensive areas. But already in the Battle of Moscow they began to be connected initially within limits of platoon and then company strongpoints and finally battalion defensive areas. Beginning with the 1942 summer-fall campaign as a rule another two positions began to be prepared in the main line by forces of second echelons of regiments and divisions in addition to a main position. With the restoration of a corps level, a second defensive line began to be established. Because of this the depth of the tactical zone increased from 4-6 km in 1942 to 15-20 km during 1943-1945.

What led to the decrease in maneuverability of the defense? Above all there was an increase in the number of troops assigned to second echelons and reserves both in absolute calculation as well as relative to the overall makeup of front and army large strategic formations. For example, 18 of the 35 Voronezh Front divisions in the Battle of Kursk were in second echelons and reserves. Simultaneously forms of maneuver improved and it began to bear a more and more multipurpose character: reinforcement of the first echelon on threatened sectors by formations and units from the makeup of the second echelon or reserve as well as by troops redeployed from sectors not under attack; establishment of weapon groupings for a counterpreparation; wide use of mobile obstacle detachments and antitank reserves; and an increase in the effectiveness of counterattacks and counterthrusts. By the way, under certain conditions and with skilled leadership, the success achieved in the course of counterthrusts (above all seizing and holding the initiative) in some cases made possible their development into a counteroffensive and the creation of preconditions for defeating the enemy main body without even having superiority in personnel and equipment. The counteroffensive at Moscow can serve as an example.

Thus, war experience showed that a positional defense was the principal form of defense. Meanwhile, maneuver

operations assumed the importance of one of the deciding factors ensuring its stability. At the same time it became clear that an offensive by major enemy forces could be halted only within the framework of a defensive operation with the involvement of several (2-3) fronts.

**How are positional and maneuver operations correlated in a modern defensive operation?** Which of them should be given preference depending on the situation? How can their optimum combination be achieved? In considering these questions, we will proceed from the assumption that the attacking side is conducting combat operations in accordance with the "air-land operation (battle)" concept. The western military press emphasizes that under this concept, after delivering deep conventional fires, the attacker will attempt to exploit their results in short time periods by personnel and equipment of an airborne echelon (execute a maneuver by airmobile units through air space) and by attacks of powerful armored force groupings from the front to penetrate the enemy defense. By such operations he will attempt to split the defending side's combat formation from the front and disrupt the integrity of the defense. His intention to shift from operational to tactical coordination between force groupings delivering the attack from the front and those operating in the opposition's rear, and in the final account to ever closer consolidation of their efforts for increasing rates of advance into the depth in order to defeat the enemy first echelon and advancing reserves without allowing the unification of their efforts is also understandable.

What must be done to deny the attacker an opportunity to accomplish this mission? In our view, the important factor is **to concentrate main efforts in the tactical defensive zone without permitting its penetration or the unification of efforts of the attacker's troops operating from the front and in the defender's rear.** Here it is obviously important to use the principle of "not a step backward" tested in the past war years in organizing the defense as a positional defense. Meanwhile, as we already have emphasized, the positional stability of the defense not only presumes, but is impossible without active maneuver, the importance of which for raising the stability of the defense clearly is increasing. For example, it is common knowledge that modern weapons are capable of inflicting such damage that considerable breaches can result in sectors planned for the breakthrough (western military literature frequently uses the term "operational windows"). To eliminate them it will be necessary to maneuver the delivery of fires and, exploiting their results, to move forces up from the second echelon or reserve or from a less dangerous axis to planned breakthrough sectors in short time periods.

One also cannot fail to consider that the attacker certainly will use the most diverse measures for misleading the enemy in a very broad range, particularly by simulating the delivery of attacks on diversionary axes. In this case as well it will be necessary to maneuver fire, personnel and equipment to where the genuine concentration of his efforts is ascertained. As shown by the

experience of exercises conducted in armies of the NATO countries, during an offensive he will persistently seek the weakest places in the opposing side's defense, retargeting his main body's attacks to these axes. It is known from Great Patriotic War experience that in this case the danger can be eliminated on the one hand by swiftly organizing a countermaneuver, and on the other hand by executing it at a rate exceeding enemy rates of advance. Obviously the need for a maneuver will arise rather often to take subunits and units away from likely deliveries of fire, especially precision weapons, or to replace those which have lost combat effectiveness.

And finally, **maneuver is the basis in preparing and conducting counterattacks and counterthrusts.** We will dwell on this question in somewhat more detail. The opinion has been firmly established in theory and practice that they are the highest manifestation of aggressiveness in the defense. In agreeing with this assertion, we would propose a number of the following considerations in the way of a discussion. Fire confrontation assumes decisive importance in attaining objectives of the operation or the battle in connection with increased weapon capabilities (foreign literature notes that the effectiveness of certain precision weapon systems even now is comparable with that of tactical nuclear weapons). Thus, in our opinion, an increase in the priority of delivering conventional fires is one of the leading trends in the theory and practice of the modern operation or battle. As a consequence of this we see that **the degree of activeness of the defense under present-day conditions is determined above all by capabilities in maneuvering the delivery of conventional fires.** But if one agrees with this statement, then changes also are obvious in the content of counterthrusts and counterattacks, which now are being viewed as the highest manifestation of a defense's activeness. Our viewpoint is that under present-day conditions **the delivery of conventional fires probably should be considered the principal factor in the content of the counterthrust or counterattack. Combined-arms formations and units are the means called upon to take maximum advantage of, consolidate, and build up its results.**

In being among the troops and taking part in exercises of varying scale, we rather often encountered the fact that a certain stereotype has been produced in the approach to conducting counterattacks or delivering a counterthrust. Its essence briefly is that when the enemy arrives at a certain line the trainee deems counterattacks to be almost mandatory, beginning with the battalion second echelon and further successively by the second echelons or reserves of each higher level. What can be said on this score?

*First.* In our opinion, with extremely rare exception, counterattacks by second echelons of regiments defending in the first and second positions of the main line of defense (not to mention counterattacks by battalion second echelons) hardly are advisable. We will cite just one argument as confirmation. The foreign military press emphasizes that an attacker can count on success if he preserves a fivefold or sixfold superiority over the



enemy at the moment of initiating the assault. Even given the fact that the attacker will suffer certain losses in fighting for the first position, nevertheless, he obviously will be able to preserve a significant advantage. It is clear that under such conditions the decisive objectives set for the counterattacker are hardly achievable, but such consequences as unjustified losses and disruption of the defense's stability are fully likely. As shown by Great Patriotic War experience, it is more advisable here to strive not to dislodge the enemy but, **stubbornly holding the occupied positions, to knock out the maximum possible number of armored targets in his combat formations, weakening the first echelon's striking power.**

*Second.* If a decision really has been made to conduct counterthrusts and counterattacks, they must pursue fully specific and decisive objectives such as inflicting maximum damage on a certain enemy force grouping, or when it is necessary to halt his advance to prevent him from taking a line convenient for subsequently delivering a counterthrust by friendly forces and there are no other opportunities for this. In other instances, in our view, it is necessary to come up with at least two or three alternative options for operations, choosing the one permitting the enemy to be effectively pressured and preventing significant losses of friendly personnel and equipment. For example, based on exercise experience, it is often more advantageous to give preference not to counterattacking, but to inflicting damage on the attacker by the reserve (or a portion of second echelon forces) from a preplanned (and if there is time also a prepared) line of firing positions. Employing a portion of the reserve and second echelon for deceiving the enemy by denoting a counterthrust on a diversionary axis obviously can be acceptable in a certain situation. A

counterattack also can be conducted as a secondary action in support of the main body delivering the counterthrust.

*Third.* Experience in Great Patriotic War showed that counterthrusts and counterattacks cannot be successful without thorough preparation and comprehensive support. The troop attack must be preceded by a surprise delivery of conventional fires and their movement must be executed with continuous close-support fire and reliable air cover.

Thus, reliably holding the tactical defensive zone will be of decisive importance in the course and outcome of a defensive operation and in attaining its objectives, especially in the initial period of war. Troops must combine positional and maneuver forms of warfare in an optimum manner, and the principal objective of maneuver operations is seen as ensuring stability of the defense.

Moving on to further examination of the problem, we will recall that according to prewar views, the defensive operation [operatsiya] was seen as a combination of successive defensive engagements in corresponding defensive zones. But a trend toward simultaneously engaging the enemy both from the front and in the depth of his operational alignment already was seen to an ever greater extent in the course of World War II. Not only air pressure, but also the insertion of airborne assault forces into the enemy rear area and even the conduct of air operations was intended (characteristics of some of them are given in Table 4). But such operations did not become widespread because of the difficulty of organization and support, a shortage of equipment for moving troops into the enemy rear, and lack of experience. The situation has changed radically as of the present time

Table 4—Description of Selected World War II Airborne Operations\*

Operation	Beginning of Operation	Makeup of Assault Force	Depth of Landing from Front Line, km	Duration of Independent Assault Force Operations, days
German landing during invasion of Holland	10 May 1940	Two divisions and a glider regiment (15,000 persons)	150	3
Arnhem airborne operation	17 September 1944	Three divisions and one brigade (34,870 persons)	30-90	3-9
Anglo-American landing in the Wesel area during the Rhine operation	24 March 1945	Two divisions (17,122 persons)	10-15	1

\*"Voennoye iskusstvo vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne i v poslevoynennyy period" [Military Art in World War II and in the Postwar Period]. Moscow 1986, p. 407.

Foreign military literature emphasizes that in an offensive operation combat actions can begin most likely by simultaneously including the attacks of powerful force groupings from the front, the delivery of conventional fires on the defender throughout his operational depth and above all on second echelons and reserves, and a mass landing or drop of airborne assault forces, airmobile units and raiding and reconnaissance units in his rear. As confirmation of what has been said, we will cite several figures based on experience of exercises conducted among NATO Allied Armed

Forces. The employment of up to 20-30 airmobile, airborne and amphibious assault landings was planned in many of them in the first two days after the beginning of combat operations in the enemy front zone. The depth of their landing was as follows: tactical (up to a battalion in strength) from 15 to 60 km, operational-tactical (brigade) 60-80 km, and operational (airmobile division, VTD [expansion unknown; possibly air-transportable division], airborne division) 150-200 km. Add to these forces the raiding and reconnaissance units, of which there may be 300-400 at



culminating points of the operation, and it will become clear that the struggle against these forces becomes one of the most urgent missions in a defensive operation.

There is also no doubt that this mission cannot be accomplished by passive measures alone (for example, by security and defense even of the most important installations). Considering the high mobility of these forces and the methods by which they execute missions, **the struggle in the operational defensive zone most likely will bear a clear-cut maneuver character from the very beginning of combat actions.** It can be considerably complicated if the main body of the defending force grouping is not successfully deployed by the beginning of aggression, inasmuch as in this case formations and units will be forced to move up to designated lines and positions and occupy them under pressure of enemy weapons and aviation while simultaneously repelling attacks of the enemy air echelon (airborne forces, airmobile units, and raiding and reconnaissance units) and of subunits and units which have penetrated from the front.

As already noted, one of the basic provisions of the U.S. concept of the "air-land operation (battle)" and the N. TO "follow-on forces attack" is that the mission is assigned to engage enemy second echelons (reserves) simultaneously with the first echelon for achieving the ultimate objective—defeating the opposing defensive force grouping—in short time periods. But above all the attacker obviously will attempt to immobilize the defender's forces in the depth of his operational formation by aggressive operations, disrupt the forward movement of those of his forces intended for reinforcement or operations in the tactical defensive zone, and prevent the organized and timely occupation of lines in the depth of the defense.

What can counter this? One of the main ways is engaging the main body of the attacker's air echelon in its concentration areas (it must be borne in mind that an attacker will need a certain amount of time to clarify results of the first massive strike and also to deliver a repeat strike against certain areas for commitment of the air echelon), during the airlift, and during the landing. Here we would single out in particular the timely detection and destruction of airlift equipment, above all helicopters, at the time when it is most vulnerable—on airfields and landing strips.

And what if the enemy still succeeds in airlifting a certain portion of personnel and equipment of the air echelon? In our opinion, it is necessary to proceed from the following consideration in organizing the struggle against them. In the case where these are considerable forces and their probable operations may threaten to disrupt the successful conduct of a defensive operation, it possibly will be necessary to involve a considerable portion of conventional weapons for a certain time to deliver a strike against these forces and subsequently complete their rout using both combined-arms units and subunits as well as units and subunits of combat arms and special forces (specifically rout them, inasmuch as

localizing their operations or sealing them off in certain areas may subsequently make them a base for creating an actively operating front in the defender's rear). On the other hand, until totally eliminated they are capable not only of diverting certain personnel and equipment to themselves, but also of destabilizing as a whole the combat activities of the defender's troops in the operational-tactical depth.

On the whole, however, positional forms of warfare obviously are less typical of combat operations in the operational zone. A transition to them is most likely in case of an enemy breakthrough to any line in the depth of the defender's operational alignment or when preparing for defense of operationally important areas, administrative-industrial centers, as well as installations which must be held to ensure successful troop operations: transportation hubs, crossings over major water obstacles, pass sectors of roads in mountainous terrain and so on.

In this article we tried to consider questions of the correlation of positional and maneuver forms of warfare based on the positional form being the main form of defense, and at the same time to show that along with an increase in the role of other factors, its stability will depend to an ever greater extent on the troops' ability and readiness to conduct maneuver operations.

#### Principles of Military Art and Tactics of SAM Forces

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[Text] Continuing a discussion<sup>1</sup> begun in the pages of the journal, the author develops the thought about realization of the basic principles of military art in the tactics of SAM forces as applied to modern conditions of fighting the air adversary.

The dynamism and depth of the process of opposition between air attack forces and air defense weapons today has no analogue in history. An extremely diverse arsenal of means of attack and destruction from the air has been created. The transition to the mass use of drones and airborne platforms for precision long-range weapons is becoming more and more apparent in its development. NATO armies have adopted integrated reconnaissance-strike systems which realize the "search-fire-destroy" principle. Electronic warfare has ceased to be only a form of support and, in the opinion of foreign specialists, has developed into a unique form of combat operations.

Fundamental changes presently occurring in the material basis and conditions of opposition between air attack and air defense forces dictate the need for a dialectical analysis of the content and features of realizing chief principles of the military art in tactics of branches of the Air Defense Forces, including SAM forces.

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Let us examine certain aspects of the realization of these principles.

The **principle of high combat readiness** under conditions where the aggressor's principal method of initiating wars is the delivery of surprise attacks from the air is of special importance for Air Defense Force groupings. In addition, even in peacetime the mission of guarding the USSR state border's air space is assigned to the Air Defense Forces. Any attempts to violate it must be decisively stopped.

The complex nature of the content of combat readiness also demands a corresponding approach to organizing and conducting all measures of ensuring it. The basis of such measures, with consideration of specific features of missions being accomplished by SAM forces, consists of establishing systems of fire, reconnaissance, and command and control by advance deployment of units and subunits into combat formation and their preparation for combat operations and for alert duty; and establishing readiness periods for the forces (including alert forces) to perform combat missions based on time available. But conditions for SAM force groupings' engagement of the latest offensive air weapons and precision weapons also make these seemingly immutable provisions of the realization of the principle of combat readiness contradictory and require a dialectical approach to all aspects in preparing their combat operations.

The effectiveness and stability of point or area air defense depend on many factors. For example, timely deployment of units into combat formation in a situation where there is a threat of surprise air attack contributes on the one hand to their increased combat readiness and on the other hand leads to disruption of their grouping's concealment and of surprise in opening fire. With modern reconnaissance capabilities, force groupings established in advance cannot be concealed for long even if they fulfill all requirements of operational and tactical maskirovka [lit. "camouflage", however, includes "concealment" and "deception"—FBIS] because of clear-cut revealing signs of their activity. Therefore, with complete coordinate information about elements of the grouping, the enemy can take effective actions for its neutralization and can achieve substantial results.

Consequently it is impossible to realize the principle of high combat readiness of the SAM force grouping only through advance deployment of subunits at battle positions. At the present time *the dynamic nature of troop combat activity* is a very important factor for ensuring high effectiveness and stability of the defense.<sup>2</sup> Performance of alert duty by a portion of forces at the positions must be combined with concealed forward movement from stationing locations of all subunits and units having the mission of point or area coverage against air attacks and their deployment into combat formation within prescribed time periods. With this method of placing a SAM force grouping in readiness to repel an aggressor's strike, *troop mobility* (i.e., their capability for rapid,

covert movement and deployment into combat formation) and advance preparation of position areas assume priority importance.

**Destruction of the air adversary on the approaches to points ahead of his mission execution lines** is a fundamental principle in organizing air defense and conducting SAM forces' combat operations. The enemy mission execution line is understood to be a conditional line where, on reaching it, his aviation can employ weapons against the defended point that cannot be destroyed (or can be destroyed with insufficient effectiveness) by the SAM force grouping. In essence this line also is the SAM force grouping's mission execution line, since only when air targets are destroyed ahead of it is the protection of points and troops against air strikes ensured.

This principle also was the basis for organizing air defense of major points in the Great Patriotic War. The anti-aircraft artillery [AAA] force grouping was organized to inflict decisive damage on the air adversary on the approaches to a defended point before the so-called probable bomb release line. But the content and conditions of its realization have changed radically at the present time.

The priority in selecting the means of attack and destruction and the variant of the strike against a defended point rests with the enemy. Therefore the distance of the mission execution line, relative to the point, changes within wide limits. In repelling low altitude air strikes involving free-falling bombs, the line is close to the boundaries of the defended point, but when engaging aircraft that are platforms for long-range precision weapons (air-to-surface missiles, "smart" bombs) it coincides with their launch or release line and is a considerable distance away, exceeding the reach not only of medium range SAM systems, but also low altitude SAM systems and as a rule long range SAM systems. Moving air defense subunit positions away from defended points (where possible) by an amount which transfers SAM system envelopes beyond the enemy mission execution line for different variants of his operation permits defending points against air strikes, but requires a large number of personnel and equipment for their perimeter defense. Therefore, realizing the principle of destroying the air adversary ahead of a given line is a complex matter requiring integrated employment of various types of SAM systems and a search for new operational-tactical solutions in organizing air defense. In this regard the objectivity also of such principles of SAM forces' tactics as **coordinated joint use of SAM systems (complexes) of various types and purposes and the close coordination of SAM forces with other air defense troops and forces** becomes obvious.

Establishing mixed SAM force groupings with a common fire plan of air defense weapons for different purposes is a very important direction for improving the air defense system from the standpoint of considering the dependence of methods of warfare on features of the opposing

sides' weapons. It is customary to divide SAM force groupings according to nature of alignment into point, line, area, and point-line (point-area).

*Point groupings* are established for immediate defense of important points and are structured according to the principle of a perimeter defense with the efforts concentrated on the most likely axes of enemy air operations. Destruction of aircraft and cruise missiles ahead of the mission execution line is supported by moving the SAM system envelopes out. But it is not always possible to ensure reliable protection of a point to the full extent when the air adversary employs long-range weapons. At the same time, such force groupings also have certain inherent advantages: relatively high stability of the defense (to deliver an attack the enemy is forced to penetrate each point's air defense); possibility of decisively concentrating forces for defense of the most important points and organizing effective air defense in a range of low altitudes with limited forces; and precise delineation of missions and areas of combat operations for coordinating units of fighter aviation and SAM forces.

The *line grouping* defends specific air axes by creating zones of continuous SAM fire usually on distant approaches to defended points, i.e., in principle the battle against offensive air weapons is conducted ahead of their mission execution lines. Its basic drawback is low stability. It is enough for the air adversary to penetrate the established air defense line in order to make the approach to strike targets.

*Zone groupings* of SAM forces are constructed according to the principle of a perimeter defense of important economic areas (several points) situated at slight distances from each other. Their establishment helps increase the effectiveness and stability of the SAM defense using the available makeup of air defense personnel and equipment.

*Point-line (point-area) groupings* of mixed SAM forces combine immediate defense of the most important points with defense of air axes (areas). Possessing advantages of both kinds of force groupings, they permit realizing basic combat employment principles of SAM forces to the greatest extent and accomplishing the mission of protecting points and troops when the enemy has a diverse arsenal of weapons for attack and destruction from the air.

Air defense system reliability is ensured by joint employment and close coordination of air defense troops and forces of different branches of the Armed Forces to engage the air adversary. Information, fire, and supply coordination are the basic kinds of tactical coordination.

*Information coordination* is organized to provide unit command posts (command and control facilities) with the most complete and reliable information about the air adversary and about the status and actions of friendly

forces. Such methods as technical or structural interfacing of elements of unit or subunit information systems, combining command posts (command and control facilities), and a periodical exchange of information between them over coordination communications channels are used chiefly at the tactical level. Such procedures as receiving decentralized notification of targets, receiving air situation data from the nearest information sources (radar or ELINT), establishing television channels for data transmission and reception, and interfacing automation equipment systems of coordinating units in a common automated control system have found wide use in interfacing information systems in units and subunits.

*Fire coordination* is accomplished by distributing fire (or efforts) against airborne targets for inflicting maximum losses on the enemy, for concentrating fire against groups of air attack weapons (targets) for their reliable engagement, and for giving cover fire to coordinating personnel and equipment in conducting battle. In the general instance the variant of fire coordination of mixed air defense forces which is being realized must ensure that the distribution of efforts conforms to the degree of relative importance of the airborne targets.

Problems of joint employment of SAM forces and fighter aviation and of ensuring safety of operations of friendly aircraft are especially difficult to resolve. There has been a sharp increase in spatial characteristics both of zones of fire of SAM force groupings as well as of air-to-air combat of air defense fighters. At times it is practically impossible to distribute operations of SAM forces and fighter aviation by zones and lines. In organizing air defense a need arises to determine their operating procedure in a space with overlapping zones and to preclude the possibility of friendly aircraft being fired on in error in zones of fire of the mixed SAM force grouping. Such joint combat operations of SAM forces and fighter aviation can be based only on the use of high technical capabilities of systems for reconnoitering the air adversary, estimating the situation, identifying airborne targets and exercising command and control.

**The principle of a decisive concentration of efforts on defense of the most important points (main force groupings), on the most probable axes, and at the most probable altitudes of the air adversary's operations** is a specific definition of the general principle of the military art of decisively concentrating efforts on the most important axes (or in the most important areas) at the decisive moment for executing primary missions. The experience of the Great Patriotic War and of local wars attests that the commander always experiences a shortage of personnel (there always are more points to cover and missions to execute than there are capabilities) in making a decision on air defense matters. Therefore, this principle indicates the need here for considering the relative importance of points or areas and the threat of axes and altitude ranges of the air adversary's operations, since, guided by a similar principle, he will deliver strikes above all against the most important points (main



force groupings) by massing personnel and equipment. But his choice of air attack weapon axes and altitudes of operations is determined to a considerable extent by the nature of the established air defense system. In realizing this principle as well as the principle of combat readiness, the latter circumstance brings to the foreground the problem of increasing the mobility and flexibility of air defense, i.e., the capability of countering different options of enemy operations with sufficiently effective operations of friendly forces.

Realization of such principles as **surprise, activeness, and decisiveness of operations and the maneuver of personnel and equipment** in SAM forces' tactics also is linked directly with air defense mobility. Therefore, there is a need to examine the essence and certain aspects of this problem in more detail. On a theoretical plane a mobile defense should be understood to be a defense established on the basis of personnel and equipment of mobile SAM forces and is conducted with wide use of their maneuver both before the beginning and in the course of combat operations. The tactical maneuver of personnel and equipment includes the maneuver of subunits or units, fire, and missiles.

The *maneuver by subunits or units* has the objective of ensuring concealment of the fire plan, surprise of fire pressure against the air adversary, and survivability of the force grouping; misleading the enemy with respect to the true nature of the defense and the commander's concept; concentrating forces on decisive axes and lines in accordance with the existing situation and employing them with greatest effectiveness; promptly restoring a disrupted system of fire and command and control; and redeploying forces to accomplish newly arising missions. Conduct of a mobile air defense presumes the use of all possible methods of mobile operations. These can be moving forward out of disposition areas and occupying positions for conducting battle (on condition of ensuring promptness of maneuver and preempting the enemy in operations); realigning the combat formation in accordance with the defense concept (this counters enemy actions of choosing an attack option with consideration of weak places in the defense); moving subunits out from under an attack; periodically changing positions (a system of positions is used that has been chosen in advance in the position area); operating from "ambushes"; moving up to maximum-penetration intercept lines for enemy air attack weapons; maneuvering based on the situation for restoring a disrupted fire plan, and so on.

*Maneuver by fire* is accomplished by decision of unit commanders in accordance with the concept for conducting the air defense battle (or repelling a strike by the air adversary) and consists of a transfer of fire of long-range and medium-range SAM systems to new or more important group and individual targets for priority or guaranteed destruction.

The exceptional fluidity and intensity of air defense battles, the integral confluence of operations during their

conduct aimed at protecting defended points and preserving combat effectiveness of the SAM system grouping, a certain equivalence of these factors (it is impossible to execute the mission without having preserved one's combat effectiveness), and at the same time the need for achieving success in the first battle dictates the contradictory nature of the problem of realizing the **principle of establishing and skillfully employing SAM system reserves** at the tactical level. The question is: when repelling a swift, massive strike of the air enemy, is it advisable to remove a portion of the SAM force grouping to the reserve, i.e., to a certain extent exclude them from a given battle? And if so, then in what makeup and for accomplishing what missions?

Simulation of modern air defense battles permits the conclusion that the assignment of tactical reserves from the makeup of combat-ready forces is advisable when military operations are of a lengthy nature (or it is necessary to repel several enemy air strikes). As a rule, they are established for executing missions that arise suddenly and for keeping the combat-effectiveness of the SAM force grouping at the requisite level throughout the forecast period of point air defense. Subunits assigned to the reserve are kept in readiness to open fire as well as in readiness to march. Special attention here is given to ensuring their survivability.

Modern weapons pose difficult missions in implementing the **principle of firm and continuous command and control of SAM forces' combat operations**. *Centralized command and control* is the basic method of command and control over combat operations of SAM units and subunits. In battling the modern air adversary in the absence of automated control system equipment, it is practically impossible to accomplish tasks of collecting and analyzing air situation data and data on the status and capabilities of friendly subunits or units, estimating the optimum nature of decisions being made, and making them known to those responsible for execution without losing time, i.e., to control the SAM force grouping's fire effectively, in a centralized manner, efficiently and with high quality. Meanwhile, the **principle of combining centralized command and control with independent conduct of combat operations** must be realized in organizing air defense. This is dictated above all by the exceptional fluidity of each air defense battle.

The battle is conducted by various methods. Methods which find wide use (with the use of automated control systems) based on the characteristics of the procedure for conducting fire are those such as conduct of fire with automatic or automated target designation from command posts of SAM force units; coordination of independent fire by subunits from unit command posts (based on information about their operations at the command post); and independent conduct of fire by air defense subunits against the air adversary. The first two methods permit realizing a simultaneous and successive concentration of fire against groups of enemy air attack weapons or the most important targets and dispersal of fire for inflicting maximum losses on the air adversary.

The third method is achieved by employing such tactical procedures as delivering priority fire in the main sectors of fire and in sectors of responsibility at low altitudes, conducting fire against targets chosen according to a priority characteristic for the SAM system or based on established rules, and so on.

Air defense units and subunits must have that makeup of weapons and that organization which would ensure their capability of performing autonomous combat work as well when automated centralized command and control is disrupted or insufficiently effective. A very important factor here is the capability of independently conducting radar reconnaissance of the air adversary. It is also necessary to emphasize that centralization of command and control based on automated control systems must not lead to making SAM force groupings "stationary." Executing a maneuver of forces always involves inputting new position coordinates and other constants to the system, which places higher demands on flexibility of the automated control systems themselves as well as of the communications systems and on their capability of promptly changing the structure and location of elements.

The experience of local wars shows that depreciating the principle of combining centralized command and control and independent conduct of combat operations leads in the final account to reduced effectiveness of point or area air defense.

Such are the essence and features of realizing the basic principles of SAM forces' tactics. Their use together as a unified system is a complex, dialectically contradictory matter demanding thorough analysis and consideration of all situation elements, estimation of possible options of enemy actions, and prevision of their development prospects. The art of commanders and staffs is displayed in the ability to creatively apply the principles in practice.

#### Footnotes

1. VOYENNAYA MYSL, No 9, 1988, pp 22-30.
2. Ibid., No 1, 1989, p 36.

**Increasing the Survivability of Aircraft in the Air**  
90UM0418F Moscow VOYENNAYA MYSL in Russian  
No 3, Mar 90 (signed to press 28 Feb 90)  
pp 38-45—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Colonel A. B. Krasnov, doctor of military sciences, professor]

[Text] The experience of local wars has shown that the effectiveness of air combat operations depends to a considerable extent on aircraft survivability in the air. **Survivability is taken to mean the capability of aircraft to remain relatively invulnerable to enemy countermeasures in an unfavorable air situation created by the enemy and to perform assigned missions.**

Initially this problem encompassed a large set of diverse measures for improving aircraft tactical performance and equipment. They included increasing the speed and flight range; increasing maneuverability; armoring vital elements and reducing vulnerable areas of constructs; duplicating on-board systems and providing redundancy; and protecting against radiation, shock wave and fire. This list can be continued. But even in combination with high speed and aircraft maneuverability all those measures of protection could no longer guarantee aircraft survivability in the air when all-weather, all-altitude fighter-interceptors and SAM systems with their all-aspect guided missiles entered the air defense inventory and enemy territory became covered with continuous radar acquisition and warning fields. More sophisticated forms and methods of assuring survivability began to be sought. A new direction appeared as a result: reducing the radar, infrared and electronic signature of aircraft. It has been given the name of stealth technology abroad.

To reduce the signatures of aircraft, designers aimed at decreasing their radar cross-section (low-reflecting shapes, radar-absorbing coatings, built-in missile suspension systems) and the intensity of infrared emissions (shielding the most heated parts of engines, introducing various temperature-reducing substances to the stream of exhaust gases), and at developing low-emission and non-emitting equipment (infrared and electronic equipment operating in a passive mode). The degree of effectiveness of these measures can be judged from existing and developmental models of corresponding aircraft. For example, according to foreign press information, ground radars detect the U.S. B-2 strategic bomber at a distance of 6-13 km, or in 20-40 seconds before it approaches them.<sup>1</sup> Creation of low-signature aircraft obviously substantially increases their survivability in the air, but still does not solve the problem.

Assuring survivability not of individual aircraft, but of an entire force of combat aircraft has become most important with mass air operations under conditions of a developed enemy air defense system. The experience of local wars shows that this is achieved most successfully not so much by military-technical measures as by operational-tactical measures. Two trends have been seen here: penetrating to targets "by force" and evading engagement by enemy air defense forces and equipment.

These trends are not new, but they are acquiring a completely different content judging from the views of NATO military leaders and the experience of exercises they hold as well as of the latest local wars.

**Penetrating to strike objectives "by force"** based on the effective engagement and electronic suppression of air defense weapons, must ensure survivability of aircraft flying through overlapping SAM system envelopes and penetrating a screen of fighter aircraft armed with long-range missiles and capable of operating day or night in any weather conditions. Therefore, at the present time even a large numerical superiority of aircraft still does



not guarantee successful execution of combat missions, unless necessary advance steps are taken to increase their survivability by reliable suppression of the enemy air defense system. This situation did not exist 20-30 years ago, when destroying air defense weapons was a secondary mission for the air force. At that time, however, there also did not exist such a powerful air defense system negotiated basically by flying at extremely low or high altitudes, bypassing air defense zones, or by some other tactics. Therefore, *engaging air defense weapons becomes a deciding condition for aircraft preservation*. It requires the diversion of considerable forces, which unquestionably reduces the power of strikes against planned targets. This is why instead of a *negotiation of air defense* (a concept taken to mean only partial neutralization of air defense and various avoidance maneuvers), its *penetration*, for which all forces and equipment taking part in a strike are used, is being employed more and more widely.

Air tactics in penetrating enemy air defense consist of creating corridors by the effective engagement and electronic suppression of air defense weapons for the transit of strike elements to targets. Initially, specially assigned aircraft and unmanned equipment neutralize air defense weapons from zones bordering the penetration sectors and use long-range missiles to deliver strikes against radar stations and SAM systems. Then strike elements proceed to strike objectives and in turn jam the air defense equipment. Covering fighters also are included in air defense suppression elements (Fig. 1).

A reduction in the time spent penetrating the air defense and delivering mass strikes assumes very great importance for preserving air forces and reducing their losses. This is a very essential circumstance, because the briefer the presence of aircraft over enemy territory, the less time air defense weapons have to engage those participating in the strike. To reduce the time of aircraft engagement by air defense weapons, the aircraft must operate at high density in narrow corridors and concentrate their efforts on the most important targets. Only then, in our opinion, can a brief, massive strike in combination with effective engagement and electronic suppression have proper success.

**Of the entire set of measures aimed at preserving air forces in the air, the greatest changes are occurring in the methods of combat operations of supporting fighters.** Until recently it was believed that a fighter patrol escort of strike elements (to and from target) was the primary method, but its significance has declined noticeably in recent years.

In analyzing the changes occurring in the nature of air operations, one can conclude that they result chiefly from the high speeds and great maneuver parameters of fighters. Being near the strike elements, they are constrained in their actions since even a simple 180° turn inevitably leads to separation from the escorted aircraft. In addition, it must be noted that there has been an increase in distance and an expansion in the range of

directions of possible attacks by enemy fighter-interceptors. Armed with all-aspect air-to-air missiles, they can engage strike aircraft from all sides and from distances considerably exceeding the distance between covering fighters and strike elements.

But the fighters are forced to devote more attention to maintaining contact with strike elements, rather than to searching for the air adversary. Such an attachment to the screened aircraft deprives the fighters of the initiative of choosing a favorable moment for commitment and denies them freedom of maneuver; therefore, other methods of combat operations become predominant. For example, in the 1982 Lebanese conflict Israeli F-15 and F-16 fighters rejected joint flights with the strike elements. Instead of a traditional escort, coordination was accomplished with them by time and lines within the boundaries of the strike area. Before strike elements approached the targets, fighters moved forward and formed multi-tier screens. There was one other factor contributing to such actions: this entire area was under continuous radar observation from an airborne command post (E-2C Hawkeye), which monitored the overall air situation and adjusted operations of strike elements and supporting fighters.

How can aircraft of strike elements, operating en masse in dispersed combat formations and maneuvering vigorously in the course of executing combat missions, be effectively protected? The answer to this question obviously lies in concentrating the efforts of fighter aircraft on covering not individual elements, but all aircraft in a specific area and at certain time intervals within the scope of a combined combat mission. Ground alert in readiness for immediate take-off, combat air patrol, sending screens to axes of possible appearance of enemy fighters, as well as feints and diversionary actions by individual pairs and flights across a broad front can be used successfully for these purposes.

But the effect of surprise in strikes against targets is lost to a considerable extent in laying out corridors in the enemy air defense system under the "power" principle, since a large number of aircraft are concentrated in a limited area of air space. This is the first point. Secondly, it generates active opposition on the part of the enemy, and above all on the part of his surviving air defense weapons and those suppressed but having the capability of rapid restoration. Therefore, to increase aircraft survivability measures should be widely used **permitting avoidance of effective engagement by air defense forces and based on increasing the proportion of enemy disinformation and on further development of all forms of maneuver.**

A search for and application of effective forms of disinformation of the enemy becomes a characteristic feature of air tactics. Disinformation is accomplished to conceal the makeup of forces and the time and direction of air strikes and must include a set of measures which will lead to information saturation of the air defense's system for data collection and processing, target allocation and

Fig. 1. Organization of Air Defense Penetration (Variant)



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designation and will force the enemy to expect aircraft where in fact aircraft are not planned to be used.<sup>2</sup>

To achieve these objectives, forces of attack, reconnaissance and drone aircraft can be created on secondary (false) axes in addition to preparing massive strikes on the main axis. It is advisable to use them at the beginning of active operations to suppress radar stations and SAM weapons not only in penetration corridors, but also along the entire extent of the front line, with increased activity on false axes. Such operations are especially necessary in delivering retaliatory strikes or surprise retaliatory counterblows. Hopes for a surprise penetration of the air defense system will hardly be borne out under conditions where the enemy has the initiative and his air defense system is in full readiness to repel massive raids on axes predicted in advance and at a known time.

Experience shows that feints by aircraft are advantageous in periods preceding massive strikes. They can include a set of well conceived and interrelated measures for misleading the enemy relative to the intents of air force operations. This can include simulating a massive scrambling of aircraft from airfields, transmitting dummy commands over radio, jamming radars and so on. All of them must be plausible to the maximum extent and be carried out in a coordinated manner under a scenario, which should precisely spell out the role, place, scale and time of each of them, developed in advance. A successful choice of the time for beginning such operations and their conformity to information which the enemy has are capable of forcing him to place the entire air defense weapon system in readiness and scramble fighters prematurely. And when the vigilance of SAM system crews becomes dulled and fighters go in to land after using up their fuel, it is in this very period that they must be brought under attack in a massive raid which has begun, timed for this moment.

And finally, disinformation measures can arrange the use of various decoy targets on a wide scale and employing previously unknown methods. Some do not have their own power plants and function briefly. Others, equipped with navigation gear, active jammers and automatic chaff dispensers, can fly for a long time along paths similar to aircraft routes.

Decoy targets can be used together with combat aircraft. In this case a more complicated air situation in which it is difficult to perform target selection is created for the enemy and he will be forced to assign a portion of the weapons to engage the decoys, thereby reducing the density of fire against combat aircraft. An option of decoy targets operating alone is possible, especially on air defense weapons' acquisition and intercept lines and chiefly for misleading guidance equipment.<sup>3</sup>

Extensive use of all kinds of maneuver is the most characteristic feature of actions by individual crews and small groups of aircraft. As shown by the experience of

local wars, the altitude maneuver as well as the fighter-evasion maneuver and antiaircraft fire evasion maneuver have undergone substantial changes (Fig. 2).


The [verticle] altitude maneuver (until recently) and subsequent actions at low altitudes no longer permit aircraft to avoid engagement by low-altitude SAM and AAA systems. Therefore, a need arises to further reduce flight altitude. The war in Afghanistan showed that it must not exceed 15-20 m (the height of the lower boundary of the Stinger SAM system envelope). Where crews are operating at that altitude it is difficult to judge what will become more dangerous for them: engagement by air defense weapons or a collision with the ground. In addition, in flying at extremely low altitude it is difficult to search for camouflaged mobile targets and to employ guided bombs and other precision weapons. Just how do pilots act in such situations? They are forced to go to medium altitudes, but this maneuver, however brief, leads to loss of concealment of operations.

To ensure a fast, concealed flight at very low altitude, the aircraft inventory must have more sophisticated look-down radars permitting crews to adjust direction and flight altitude before making the approach to targets and launching missiles against them, but the development of such radars still is very far from completion. A combination of an altitude maneuver with electronic suppression of the enemy by the crews themselves turns out to be more sensible. A necessary condition for this is the presence of on-board EW and reconnaissance systems supporting the suppression not only of individual targets, but also of the enemy air defense system in the transit corridor. Difficult conditions for crew operations at extremely low altitude generate an acute need for automating the processes of acquiring radar signals, identifying them, determining the threat priority and producing commands for turning on appropriate jamming equipment.<sup>4</sup>

The fighter-evasion maneuver is executed by crews to avoid encountering enemy fighters, to depart from an area of their possible attack or to disrupt aimed fire. Not long ago the basic maneuver, known back in World War II, was to turn toward attacking fighters at maximum possible turn rate. Further outfitting of fighters with radar sights and air-to-air guided missiles with limited maneuver characteristics and short launch ranges still did not lead to substantial changes in the nature of fighter-evasion maneuvering, since the missiles passed by when aircraft under attack made sharp turns.

When more sophisticated missiles entered the fighter inventory permitting aircraft to be attacked from various aspects, from longer range, and covertly, the maneuver to evade them became substantially more complicated and filled with new elements. To execute it crews began to use on-board systems warning of the fighters' launch of missiles. When missiles are detected the crews turn on jammers and IR flares. If the missile has been "blinded," then regardless of the size of the horizontal or vertical angle at which it was detected, the most advisable

Fig. 2. Maneuver Actions of Aircraft in Destroying a SAM Force Grouping (Variant)



maneuver becomes the high-g turn in a direction perpendicular to the missile's line of flight.

Consequently, the crews of aircraft under attack now can begin a fighter-evasion maneuver purposefully, since they know the location of the fighters and the missiles the latter have launched. They combine a hard turn with the use of EW equipment. Crew actions are becoming more and more automated.

The **antiaircraft fire evasion maneuver** is executed by crews to bypass envelopes of SAM and AAA systems or to reduce the likelihood of being hit in case they enter them. It has very many varieties. It can be said that there are as many varieties as there are dueling situations in combating SAM's, but according to data of research conducted abroad, none of them provides the desired results if the maneuver is executed in a "pure form," i.e., without fire and electronic pressure against air defense weapons. The fact is that aircraft already are opposed by SAM systems with phased arrays and by close-in weapon systems with thermal-imaging, television sights, infrared

and laser homing systems not subject to the effect of radar jamming and permitting continuous tracking of the maneuver of targets.<sup>5</sup>

In this connection some military analysts conclude that in zones of continuous SAM and AAA fire, crews are deprived of an opportunity to use bypassing maneuvers despite their knowledge of weapon system combat features and their disposition on the terrain. In executing these maneuvers where there are no continuous zones, however, they can become a convenient target for highly mobile systems which continuously change position and fire from ambush.

A further increase in survivability of aircraft in the air is dictated chiefly by the growing acuity of its opposition to enemy air defense, which is constantly improving. New-generation combat aircraft are powerful and fast with a wide range of employment altitudes, more economical fuel expenditure and increased radius of action. Their survivability is increased to a considerable extent by outfitting with new types of long-range precision weapons (air-to-surface guided missiles, glide bombs



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with rocket boosters and so on); this ensures delivery of strikes against distant targets without the platforms entering the air defense zone or even the opposing side's territory.

Skilled maneuvering against the pressure of surviving air defense weapons helps increase the survivability of aircraft on the approach to strike objectives through corridors already "cut" in the air defense system. Losses also are reduced by including aircraft with a very low radar cross-section and weak IR emission in strike elements. Their capability of penetrating to strike objectives unnoticed by enemy air defense radar and IR acquisition equipment will allow crews to operate in small groups and even alone at the medium and high altitudes most convenient for aircraft. In any case, to preserve covertness it is important to observe strict limitations in using electronics and almost total radio silence during the flight.

Some western experts assume that aircraft being developed with stealth technology will be invisible only for radars of weapon systems and those being used for vectoring fighters, but they can be detected by powerful air defense radars with wide coverage zones and by other equipment operating on new target location principles. Therefore, crews must use tactics as well as EW equipment for their protection. Repeater jammers which create powerful jamming on radar screens are the most effective of the EW equipment.<sup>6</sup>

The West attaches no less importance to ensuring survivability of aircraft accomplishing stand-off missions: jammer aircraft, radar early warning and control aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft with long-range equipment, and air elements of integrated reconnaissance-strike complexes. If they are outside ground air defense weapon envelopes, their crews naturally will not need to maneuver to avoid antiaircraft fire and they will be able to execute the fighter-evasion maneuver in close coordination and under cover of friendly air defense weapons.

Radar early warning and control aircraft require the maximum air survivability. Playing an important role in controlling aircraft, they will be priority targets for enemy fighters. Their survivability can be ensured by on-board radars which detect enemy fighters long before they approach, and by such tactics as withdrawing to the cover of friendly SAM systems and executing a descent maneuver into the interior of friendly territory. In addition, they can be screened by fighters controlled from on-board the early warning and control aircraft.<sup>7</sup>

The urgency of the problem of increasing aircraft survivability in the air and preserving their forces in the battle against modern air defense weapons, and the diversity of ways of solving the problem demand constant attention on the part of commanders at all levels, military scientists, and designers; clarification of views already formed in this area; and imaginative use of everything given us by past experience and by today's practice.

#### Footnotes

1. POPULAR SCIENCE, No 1, 1988.
2. INTERAVIA, No 2, 1984.
3. INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW, No 8, 1986.
4. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, No 6, 1984.
5. INTERAVIA, No 2, 1986.
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7. FLIGHT, No 3721, 1986.

### TRAINING AND UPBRINGING

#### Developing Creative Thinking in Students During Operational-Tactical Training

90UM0418G Moscow VOYENNAYA MYSL in Russian  
No 3, Mar 90 (signed to press 28 Feb 90)  
pp 46-51—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Major-General (Reserve) A. F. Shramchenko, professor]

[Text] Lieutenant-General V.P. Grishin and Colonel A.V. Ryndya raised a very important question in their article.<sup>1</sup> The point is that command and control, and particularly decisionmaking for the operation [operatsiyu] or battle, is placed in the category of creative or heuristic tasks. General of the Army S.M. Shtemenko wrote: "Once it was customary that in speaking about people of intellectual, creative labor we had in mind persons of the arts and literature, more rarely technicians, and almost never the military. Meanwhile, military affairs also demand both creative inspiration and highly developed intellect."<sup>2</sup> The monograph<sup>3</sup> "Heuristics, Science of Creative Thinking" places combat operations [deystviy] planning in that form of labor where the most important component is creativeness. These same thoughts have been expressed more than once in various critiques of field training exercises, and combat experience also convincingly attests to this.

In this regard it is necessary to note that a commander's thinking must be creative, since not only dogmatic thinking, but even formal-logical thinking, characterized by insufficient flexibility of judgments and insufficient depth in delving into the situation, cannot ensure his successful command and control activity under present-day conditions. Here it is important to stress that creativity is not just a matter of prominent military leaders. For example, the Great Patriotic War showed that thousands of officers and generals accomplished combat missions creatively and on a high professional level, which contributed greatly to victory over such a strong army as the fascist German Army. This situation is even more important now, since stereotypes in operations

with modern weapons can lead to heavy friendly troop losses and even to disruption of a combat mission's execution.

Thinking is grounded in knowledge and experience and is accomplished on the basis of them. The work of major military leaders vividly attests that creativeness must be combined with thorough, comprehensive training without fail, but a knowledge of military affairs cannot substitute for natural intellect and sharpness. At the same time, experience shows that creative thinking develops successfully when theoretical provisions are presented not as dogmas and axioms, but as fundamentals, natural laws, and principles of the operational art and tactics which commanders can rely on to apply in their practical activities given specific situational conditions.

Therefore, it is advisable to give more attention than is now being given to elaborating monographs, digests of articles and other works on the military art. Unfortunately, in recent years main efforts have focused on putting out textbooks and aids having the chief objective of substantiating provisions of regulations. It goes without saying that one must have a good knowledge of and precisely fulfill regulations, but also always remember the words of Peter I: "Don't adhere to the regulation like a blank wall, since rules are written in it, but not the times and instances." And do not forget the recommendations of M. Dragomirov, who wrote in a tactics textbook that one must consider advice concerning troop operations as all advice in general: listen to it, but in actions heed only your own reason polished by this advice. There is not one single bit of sensible advice which would not turn into the most stupid advice under certain circumstances."<sup>4</sup>

Theory has a very great significance for producing in trainees the ability to take a creative approach to accomplishing practical tasks given the specific situational conditions. Therefore, it is very important both for theorists and practitioners to express their opinions in the pages of the press, including those opinions which do not coincide with generally accepted provisions. It is advisable to publish monographs which would reflect the military art of Soviet military leaders and commanders during the Civil War, Great Patriotic War, and the fighting in Afghanistan, and the experience of troop operational training. In this case both the students and instructors will have sufficient material both for a creative discussion in seminars and for practical application of particular provisions of the military art in rehearsing operational-tactical missions.

Obviously, it is necessary to direct very careful attention toward elaborating references, tables, and digests of standards and of specifications and performance characteristics, and creating various kinds of information systems. This will increase the capacity of material being studied, it will reduce the volume of what should be memorized, and it will free up time for developing trainees' creative independence. But it should not be

forgotten that the commander must know the formats of combat orders and instructions and the various operational-tactical standards by heart. This will permit sharply increasing the *promptness* of command and control activity.

Soviet psychologists note that the most characteristic factor in developing mental abilities is not only accumulation of a store of knowledge, but also training in mental operations and procedures that have been well "worked out" and firmly fixed, and which can be categorized as intellectual abilities.<sup>5</sup> Thought operations promote the active use of available knowledge, without which they remain a dead weight. For example, in analyzing the mission of effectively engaging an attacking enemy, knowledge is mobilized about methods of its accomplishment, ammunition consumption, artillery density, and duration of fire. A transfer of decision methods and techniques does not occur mechanically from one mission to another (of a similar type). In this connection, in the training programs of military educational institutions it would be well to have specialized tasks in which trainees would learn to perform analysis and synthesis and other mental operations as they work them, permitting them to detail the combat mission, estimate the situation, and plan command and control measures quickly, thoroughly and comprehensively.

It stands to reason that to develop thinking it is very important not only to be able to generate trainees' interest in material being studied, but also to activate their mental activity during the class. Experience shows that this is considerably helped by skillfully linking theory with practice and with those missions which they will have to accomplish after finishing the military higher educational institutions. Trainees' thought is activated when facts and various theoretical provisions are set forth in aids and textbooks with an elaboration, with substantiation, and with a demonstration of trends in their further changes. For example, in speaking about the combat missions of a subunit or unit in battle it is desirable to reveal how they changed over a certain historical period and what caused this, to substantiate modern parameters, and to illuminate trends in their further development. Such training material also must be the basis for lectures. Consideration of evolving phenomena teaches one to think dialectically and take a creative approach to solving command and control problems.

While being strictly individual, thinking nevertheless is a socially determined activity. Therefore, it develops more successfully when the theory of military affairs is mastered and practical skills are formed in inseparable connection with trainees' ideological-political education.

Mastery of Marxist-Leninist theory and skilled application of the dialectical method permit assessing the facts and phenomena of military affairs thoroughly and comprehensively, approaching the accomplishment of combat missions creatively, and understanding the dialectics of warfare. It was not by chance that M. V. Frunze repeatedly emphasized that a commander must learn

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fully to master that method of thinking and that art of analyzing phenomena provided by Marxist teaching.<sup>6</sup>

Thus, application of the law on the unity and interpenetration of opposites can keep a commander from a one-sided estimate of the battle or operation. It is common knowledge that the enemy can be defeated only by decisive actions but, as with any phenomenon, the offensive also has negative moments. They lie in the fact that attacking troops become fatigued faster, supplies either are exhausted or are sharply reduced, and the rear falls behind. Therefore, if countermeasures are not promptly taken, then even an offensive which has begun successfully can end in a retreat. Consequently, it is important to approach a study of the phenomena of military affairs not one-sidedly, but by identifying their complex dialectical contradictions and interrelationships, which then will contribute to developing creative thought.

The aforementioned article by Lieutenant-General V. P. Grishin and Colonel A. V. Ryndya focuses attention on holding group exercises, short training problems, and other exercises with students. In particular, it stresses that in elaborating them it is necessary to create a situation that is not only difficult but also instructive. At the same time, in order for development to be consistent, i.e., go the simple to the complex, one should purposefully develop particular qualities of thought and produce a definite system by consistently building up the complexity of training material.

In our view, to do this it is advisable to determine the difficulty criteria of the situation to be created. Unfortunately, they are essentially nonexistent at the present time. As a rule, situational difficulty depends on the developers, as a result of which trainees often accomplish more difficult tasks from the standpoint of mental activities at the beginning of the training year than at the end. Civilian specialists also point out the need to elaborate difficulty criteria of tasks, saying that one of the important aspects of studying the structure of command and control activity (especially so-called "analytical" work) is to identify difficulty criteria of tasks to be accomplished by a person.<sup>7</sup> But it should be noted that this is no simple matter. To accomplish it, it is necessary for specialists in different fields of knowledge—operational art, tactics, command and control, psychology, pedagogics—to conduct joint work. Obviously, it is advisable to take the following provisions as the basis in determining situation difficulty criteria.

*First.* The amount of situational data which becomes known to trainees can serve as a criterion. Naturally, the more information a commander has, the easier it is to make a decision and conduct other command and control measures. Meanwhile, as experience shows, excessive information, especially that containing contradictory data, can complicate thinking.

*Second.* The presence or absence of a combat mission can be a measure of difficulty. In the first case a

commander will be in an easier situation, since what he must do when and even how he must function in the situation conditions that have been created is indicated to him. If he has not received directions, which can happen, he must personally first select a particular form of combat and then make a specific decision for employing the personnel and equipment at his disposal.

*Third.* The numbers of personnel and equipment at the commander's disposal and their correlation with enemy personnel and equipment. The more personnel and equipment at the commander's disposal, the easier it is for him to accomplish combat missions.

*Fourth.* The time which a commander has for decision-making and for carrying out command and control measures.

*Fifth.* The number of decisions which can be made by a commander, or the more options of choice for decision-making, the more difficult it is for him.

The existing system of teaching tactics and operational art is a serious obstacle in the path of increasing the level of trainees' operational-tactical training. An analysis of training programs shows that the following are typical problems in rehearsing missions and conducting short training problems: decisionmaking (for defense, offense, meeting engagement), assignment of combat missions, performance of ground reconnaissance, organization of coordination, decisionmaking for conducting a counter-attack, counterthrust and so on. But all these are command and control matters. Of course, it can be said that a decision cannot be made without a knowledge of tactics and the operational art, but this does not mean that a study of practical tasks of tactics and the operational art has to begin with familiarity with command and control, especially in the example of one situation. Therefore, even with an increase in training time for operational-tactical training but keeping the existing principle of training it is difficult to count on success since a real combat situation is so varied that it is impossible to encompass all its diversity no matter how many missions and short training problems one accomplishes. In addition, some examples as a rule do not lead to trainees' development of system-oriented knowledge and skills.

Based on this, it is important to correctly determine the most typical episodes in each form of combat and conduct classes on them. In the offensive they can be effective engagement of the enemy, movement up to the final coordination line, the assault, defeat of enemy reserves, commitment of the second echelon, and pursuit of a retreating enemy. It can be seen that in this case questions of tactics come to the foreground. Therefore, it is advisable to teach the art of tactics in these episodes.

As an example let us examine a class on teaching effective engagement of the enemy. For this a situation is created according to which a counterattacking regiment must destroy an enemy force grouping that has penetrated and restore the lost position. If necessary, certain



matters of the commander's decision also are announced. Trainees perform operational-tactical calculations for effective engagement with a specific enemy force grouping and the number of weapons. Then they work this same problem with a changed number of artillery and the presence or absence of aircraft.

In working the problem of engaging reserves, the trainees first study methods of engaging them when they are in concentration areas, then during their forward movement and finally during deployment. In this case it is also advisable to change the makeup of personnel and equipment at the trainees' disposal. Classes on other combat episodes also are conducted in a similar manner. On the whole, this approach to training will facilitate the development of system-oriented knowledge and prevent the formation of stereotyped decisions, and it will teach them a creative approach to accomplishing missions in a real combat situation. Subsequently in the course of conducting war games and command and staff exercises, trainees must drill in command and control and continue to improve professional expertise on the basis of fundamental, creatively assimilated knowledge and initial skills in tactical training.

An effective means of developing creative thinking is *trainees' independent elaboration of training methods materials* for holding short training problems, group exercises, war games and other exercises, for it is no secret that in accomplishing particular missions in classes, trainees often do not ponder the questions of why our forces are shifting to the defense and the enemy is attacking (or vice versa). If they themselves work out a particular drill or group exercise, however, then before creating a defense plan they have to ponder and substantiate the reason for the enemy launching an offensive. In a similar manner it is necessary to picture the entire character of the sides' combat operations and determine decision options for senior commanders and adjacent units, combat missions of the sides' forces, and many other matters. Consequently, with independent elaboration of training methods materials they have to thoroughly comprehend and find those decisions which contribute not only to the development of creative thinking, but which also conform to the situation which actually exists.

It is advisable to give trainees assignments (more than is the practice now) for elaborating short training problems, group exercises, war games and field training exercises both during hours of scheduled classes as well as on an elective basis. For example, in military command academies it would be possible to end the study of each kind of battle or operation with the elaboration of a short training problem or group exercise.

A creative approach to operational art and tactics is effectively produced during participation in *military science work and in invention and innovation activities*. Therefore, it is especially important to involve students more actively in military science societies and circles and

in scientific and methods conferences held not only in chairs, but also at the military educational institution level.

In developing creative thinking it is difficult to overestimate the significance of an instructive *critique*, which should end each operational-tactical mission or exercise. Unfortunately, a number of instructors underestimate the importance of this measure and regard it as a formal act. The fact is, however, that training practice shows that a skillfully conducted critique permits trainees to thoroughly comprehend the essence and character of the situation and the sides' concepts. But material must not be overloaded with secondary matters and details, since the important point is lost when there is an abundance of them. It is also inadvisable to set forth the theoretical part in isolation from an examination of trainees' activities, since this appears, *first of all*, to be a lecture, which in the given situation is of little interest to anyone because participants in the classes are chiefly awaiting an evaluation of their work. *Secondly*, when theoretical provisions, the requirements of higher commanders and various combat examples are set forth in considering the specific work of trainees, the latter interpret their actions more thoroughly and have a better view of the positive and negative aspects of personal training, and the evaluation of their practical activity becomes more convincing and demonstrative for them.

The organization of combat operations and command and control must be properly analyzed and evaluated, protecting the personal dignity of each trainee. Of course, this does not mean that one should not take note of existing shortcomings, but if an instructor structures his critique only on negative aspects of trainees' activity and does not take note of positive points in their work, then he may undermine their faith in their strengths and abilities. In addition, it is important to focus attention on original, bold decisions of initiative and on the application of new methods of combat operations.

Of course, it is difficult to prepare and conduct an instructive critique filled with interesting facts and combat examples. Experience shows that one must begin working on it back in the period when training materials are drawn up, with the calculation that by the end of work on a mission or exercise the instructor will have the necessary data for holding a critique.

Speaking of developing trainees' creative thought, it is necessary to state directly that the faculty's role is difficult to overestimate in this matter. It is hardly necessary to prove that only a person who is capable of thinking creatively, who possesses methods proficiency and who does not accept stereotypes can learn creativeness in tactics and the operational art. Therefore one should emphasize not only the importance of skilled selection of officers and generals for instructor positions, but also the need to conduct constant work with them, especially with young instructors, aimed at improving their operational-tactical and pedagogic training and creating favorable conditions for independent activity.



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## Footnotes

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### AMONG THE TROOPS, STAFFS AND HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS: PRACTICE AND PROBLEMS OF PERESTROYKA

#### Several Questions of Deepening the Perestroyka of Military Service

90UM0418H Moscow VOYENNAYA MYSL in Russian  
No 3, Mar 90 (signed to press 28 Feb 90)  
pp 52-63—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Conclusion\* of VOYENNAYA MYSL roundtable discussion by correspondence]

[Text]

#### Army General D. S. Sukhorukov

The defensive character of Soviet military doctrine demands that we revise a number of positions in terms of further increasing the level of officer and warrant officer combat proficiency and technical culture. To this end officer efficiency reports were made out in 1989 which permitted evaluating the professional level of each officer, general and admiral and determining his further official role.

There are many problems in cadre work requiring urgent solution. The USSR Ministry of Defense's Main Cadre Directorate is taking steps to normalize the moral atmosphere among officers even more, facilitate the protection of officers against voluntarism and rudeness of individual commanders and officers in charge, and assist in strengthening social justice in different matters of official activity and in the sphere of everyday life.

**Revision of the Statute on Performance of Military Duty by USSR Armed Forces Officers is a real step in this direction.** Elaboration of the draft of this document is concluding with consideration of suggestions which have come from districts, groups of forces and fleets and which are contained in officers' letters. Wishes expressed in the discussion of Major-General A. I. Vladimirov's article also were reflected in it.

The draft Statute provides for the following: an improvement in officer manning of the Armed Forces (the military school graduate making a pledge to accept a code of allegiance to officer honor and military service); an officer's right to discharge at his own desire after a certain term of service in officer positions or for family and other important circumstances regardless of term of service; the possibility of extending officers' service on active military duty (only with their consent) for up to five years over the maximum age, and for officers without a right to a pension until acquiring such right, naturally with the exception of persons subject to retirement; expanded rights of officials for routine promotion of officers to ensure timeliness and to eliminate existing excessive restrictions and conditionalities in this matter of importance for officers; establishment of the length of regular leave at 30, 35, 40 or 45 days (depending on years served); a significant expansion of officers' duties and responsibilities; and setting forth new standards for ensuring social and legal protection of officer cadres, including for granting weekly time off and regulating the length of duty time, for establishing glasnost and fairness in questions of performance of duty, and for increasing responsibility for performing duties in occupied positions and for observing requirements of the Statute.

Inasmuch as the grounds for discharge of officers to the reserve, including early discharge, are provided by the Law on Universal Military Obligation, *a draft of this Law also is being prepared and revised at the same time.*

Life does not stand still. That which required decisions yesterday has become reality today. By order of the USSR Minister of Defense, *positions of assistant commander (chief) for legal work have been introduced* as of 1989 in divisions, corps, armies, squadrons, flotillas, major garrisons, military commissariats of union and autonomous republics, kray and oblast military commissariats, and individual military missions of the USSR Ministry of Defense to further strengthen socialist legality and law and order and organize a legal universal educational program.

By order of the USSR Minister of Defense dated 1 August 1989, the *Provisional Statute on the Officer Assembly of the USSR Armed Forces* has been put into force to protect the legal rights and interests of officers, instill in them a sense of officer honor and dignity, increase their activeness and responsibility for performing their military duty, elevate the prestige of the Soviet officer rank, and implement principles of democratization and glasnost in the Army and Navy. It is called

upon to become a reliable support for officers in various questions of official and everyday activity.

It is difficult to agree with the author and with those comrades who took part in the discussion on a number of questions touched on in the article. Some suggestions simply are unacceptable. For example, *I cannot agree with the proposal for reducing the leave of those who have served punishment in the guardhouse.* The very fact that a serviceman was in the guardhouse is realization of a disciplinary measure. Depriving an officer even of a portion of annual leave prescribed by the USSR Constitution also would be a punishment, and we do not have the right to punish an officer twice for one and the same infraction.

**The question of three levels of pay for officers of equal duty category is not that simple.** What should be the criteria for evaluating their work, which depends moreover on the results of their subordinates? There are none, and it is practically impossible to define them. Unobjective approaches and decisions also are not precluded, and the slightest blunder in an officer's work can reduce his pay to a minimum, and this in turn will have a negative effect on the family budget and will contribute in no way to improving the effectiveness of official activity. Nevertheless, "bracketed" pay has been introduced for a number of positions as of 1 January 1990 by decision of the USSR Minister of Defense.

**Major-General A. I. Vladimirov suggests thinking over the question of returning to the retirement institution which existed in the Russian Army.** In prerevolutionary Russia discharge from state service was considered retirement in the broad sense beginning in the 18th century. Retirement did not at all mean unsuitability for service, and an officer could return to duty after a brief (or long) interruption.

The institution of retirement in the USSR has undergone changes and acquired a specific concept: an officer is unfit for military service because of age or state of health. According to the Law on Universal Military Obligation, officers who have reached the established maximum age when in the reserve or have been declared unfit for military duty with exclusion from military registration because of state of health are transferred to retirement. In this regard *it is inadvisable to incorporate the suggestion on the institution of retirement in the existing procedure for performing service* (active military duty and reserve status).

**Colonel S. V. Maltsev believes that an officer should not be kept in the Army if he does not wish to serve.** At the same time, he suggests leaving him the right to return to his previous unit or district if the officer was discharged voluntarily and if age and health permit. In this connection it should be emphasized in particular that the Army is not a place for "free visits." The specifics of military service, especially officer duty, demands giving one's all. And just what hope can there be for an officer who serves

not as required by the Motherland's interests, but essentially by whim (I will serve if I wish, I will leave if I wish, and if I get sick of civilian life accept me again)? What trust can there be in such people who themselves do not know what they want?

**The suggestions of Colonel L. Ya. Rokhlin and Lieutenant-Colonel V. G. Afanasenko on deciding questions of career growth and entry into academies, and also concerning other aspects of officer performance of duty essentially already are being implemented.** Entry to military educational institutions is based on results of competition. As a rule not one, but two or three or more candidates are examined under conditions of broad glasnost in an appointment to a higher position. All candidates for advancement, for study, or for recommendation for regular promotion or an award are considered on a mandatory basis at sessions of permanent efficiency report boards, which along with officials include representatives of party and Komsomol organizations and the officer public. Their opinions and findings are considered and are of great importance in deciding a particular question of an officer's performance of duty. We hope that the Officer Assembly also will take an active part in this work, but the final decision is made by the sole commander, who is invested with powers and bears personal responsibility for the decision which is made.

**The suggestions of Captain 2d Rank I. I. Osipov, Colonel V. V. Smirnov and others with respect to a revision of military school cadet training programs merit attention.** In fact, a determination of the optimum correlation between theoretical and practical training of cadets under higher school conditions is a very complex matter. The question of what a cadet should know and be able to do now assumes very urgent significance.

The requirement for training specialists of a *broad profile* who combine a detailed knowledge of fundamental questions of theory in integral unity with firm practical skills in their specialty has been made the basis of training in military educational institutions. The content and organization of training must conform fully to the role of graduates in the Army and Navy, and primary attention here must be focused on disciplines determining their professional military training. At the same time, the arrival of new combat equipment and weapons and the mastery of modern methods of conducting combat operations demand a prompt revision of existing programs. *This essentially is being done.* They are being revised even now.

There is also a rational kernel in their suggestions: *the officer's general culture.* If an officer does not possess broad horizons and diverse knowledge in painting, music and literature, if he writes with grammatical errors, if he cannot present his thoughts figuratively and logically, then he hardly will have the right to be considered a cultured person. Unfortunately, the cultural level and cultural needs of some officers are not high. What is troubling is that people, including young people, do not

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reach out for genuine art and for the riches of world culture, but are satisfied with various imitations and substitutes.

Instilling in himself a sense of the beautiful transforms an officer, makes him more elevated, more noble, and spiritually richer, and helps him better perform the honorable duty of defending the socialist Motherland. This is why, I believe, more place should be set aside in the curricula of higher military educational institutions for literature, music and painting in order to instill in future officers a striving for self-improvement and a desire to have access to the cultural values accumulated by mankind. This must become every person's natural inner need.

#### Army General V. I. Varennikov

Perestroyka in our country has acquired an irreversible character and encompassed all aspects of society's life. It also has not bypassed the Armed Forces. The sociopolitical changes and defensive direction of military doctrine unquestionably demanded the adoption of new principles of Army and Navy organization and development.

In studying mail from readers, one can conclude that ideas of perestroyka have affected all servicemen, and officers above all. In their letters readers do not simply state particular shortcomings and omissions, but seek methods of solving urgent problems and make specific suggestions. This is understandable. Perestroyka in the Army is gathering pace, democracy and glasnost are expanding, and the work style and methods of military cadres are being revised. An atmosphere of critical attitude toward the job and of dissatisfaction with what has been achieved is being established in military collectives. It is important that many of them already have gone from words to action, which has affected general order, military bearing, military discipline and combat readiness as a whole. This is very important.

In analyzing suggestions received by journal editors for solving problems posed in Major-General A. I. Vladimirov's article, it can be noted that they are very diverse. Some are so convincing that they have been implemented even today. Others demand study and critical analysis. Still others are entirely unacceptable. But the very fact of their appearance indicates that there are more and more people in the Army environment who are on a quest and who put their whole heart into the job.

The article and the readers' responses expressed a unanimous opinion about the need for accelerating the rates of perestroyka in the Army, giving it a planned nature, holding a broad discussion of measures being implemented in Army collectives, and holding conferences at the Armed Forces level. I must say that *such work essentially already is being done*. The discussion of these questions in the pages of our central military-theoretical journal also is a search for ways of transformation among the troops. I wish to express my opinion on some of them.

The question of increasing the independence of the division level always was urgent, but today it is especially acute. Unquestionably, the division is a very important level in the Armed Forces. Without belittling the role of this level in the organization of all servicemen's life, training and routine, it must be noted that *the priority in these and other questions, nevertheless, belongs to the regiment and the separate battalion*. In our Army it has developed historically that the regiment and separate battalion specifically are the basic tactical and administrative unit both in the Ground Forces and in other branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms. The regimental or separate battalion commander is the central figure; he organizes all the life and work of the large collective and is responsible for all kinds of support to subordinate subunits, for their training level, and for their readiness and capability to perform the combat mission. It is at this level that all theory (requirements of orders, provisions of regulations and so on) is implemented.

It is impossible to fully agree with the suggestion about introducing cost accounting to the troops. The very statement of this question, in my view, is incorrect, since the Armed Forces exist to defend their Motherland regardless of life. This is their sacred duty, but we are trying to introduce to the serviceman's awareness the thought about the need to think about what is profitable and what is unprofitable (this specifically is the basis of cost accounting).

Combat formations produce no physical assets and consequently they have no profit, nor can there be any. But cost accounting must be improved and developed with respect to USSR Ministry of Defense repair enterprises and research establishments and with respect to rear service entities. It is a question of expanding independence and of thrifty expenditure of all allocated funds and supplies.

All possible restrictions on the rights of commanders and officers in charge for using funds and existing limits, including for operating the equipment (fighting vehicles, operational training vehicles, operational support vehicles and transport vehicles), cause serious concern. As a matter of fact, it is necessary to trust the commander more and give him maximum independence in realization of allocated assets. He is obligated to make decisions for their use based on unit needs and local conditions, but at the same time he must be thoroughly trained and capable of making the only correct decision and precisely and clearly picturing the degree of his responsibility for it.

With respect to limits on equipment operation, it is advisable to grant military district commanders the right to change them within the range of the overall limit specified by USSR Minister of Defense order. Features of each unit's stationing (terrain, climate, distance of installations on which the troops' vital activities depend) must be taken into account here. Principles of zealous expenditure of allocated assets should be made the basis.



Meanwhile, it is necessary to constantly seek ways for more sensible use of equipment such as creation of a well thought out system of centralized cargo movements, wide use of simulator complexes in combat training and so on. This too is an area of thrift.

**Suggestions for expanding commanders' legal and disciplinary rights merit attention.** Obviously it would be advisable to pay officers and warrant officers a *one-time* monetary reward based on results of combat and political training for a *half-year*, not based on results of the year as at the present time, and to increase the reward to foremost servicemen to a certain size within the framework of the unit general fund. Comrade A. I. Vladimirov's suggestion about paying a monthly salary to officers and warrant officers based on minimum, average and maximum levels depending on results achieved personally as well as by subordinates when results of training are summed up already has been realized. The officer public must take part in determining the amount of monthly pay and the one-time monetary reward.

At the same time, I deem it inadvisable to reduce (to the established minimum period) the regular leave of officers and warrant officers who have been in the guardhouse for personal lack of discipline. Suggestions for delaying discharge of compulsory-term personnel from the Armed Forces by 3-6 months and granting the formation commander the right to decide the question of sending violators of military discipline to the disciplinary battalion for a period of up to three months without bringing criminal charges also are unacceptable. Colonel V. P. Panov correctly noted in his response to the article that *the above would contradict provisions of the USSR Constitution and principles of a rule-of-law state.*

**Now about suggestions for introducing a system of fines for poor quality of work.** Of course the desire to increase combat training effectiveness by employing this method deserves approval at first glance, but we are obligated to see the shady points here as well. For example, who will give a guarantee that he will succeed in avoiding unobjective evaluations and unsubstantiated punishments? This in turn can have a negative effect on the situation in the family and in the collective, and as a result also in official work. And if we take into account that a young officer must have time for adaptation and for gaining practical skills after school (by the way, one will require a year, another three years), then mistakes and miscalculations are not precluded for him in this period, and results consequently will be low. That means this category of officers will be constantly punished. In our view another way, creative application of existing forms of moral and financial incentive, is more sensible and justified.

**Concerning job placement of Soviet Army workers and employees.** The question of accepting them for work presently is decided by the unit commander. Experience has shown that this form is acceptable. Unquestionably,

it is necessary to take account of the difference in military unit stationing. It is one thing when a unit is located in or near a large city and another when it is in a sparsely inhabited area. Therefore, in garrisons where it is difficult to find a job the unit commander must give work above all to those who have large families with little support. In this case recommendations of public organizations (trade unions, women's councils, officer meetings) should be taken into account. Today this question must be given broader glasnost. But the discharge of workers and employees at the initiative of the command authority in accordance with existing legislation must be done only by coordination with the trade union committee.

Almost all readers are unanimous in saying that the division and regiment must have *TO&E support and service subunits*. At first glance everything is clear here. As a matter of fact, the question touches on many problems and can be resolved both by strengthening existing support subunits (but there are great difficulties here) as well as by increasing the number of workers and employees in military units and establishments.

**The suggestion to include a lawyer in the division and regiment TO&E has been realized.** Meanwhile, as readers correctly note, it is important for leadership cadre to increase their personal level of legal culture as quickly as possible and devote more attention to studying the officer's legal minimum.

**The readers' special attention has been drawn to combat and political training,** which is understandable. Its level always has been and remains the basis of troop combat readiness and combat effectiveness. It is for this reason that the significance of this question now is growing when a reduction of forces is under way. It is necessary to increase qualitative parameters in order not to reduce general combat capabilities. This can show up quickly and effectively above all in the training of formations and units.

The chief questions raised in this area in the discussion in the journal's pages are a change in the procedure for planning combat training and a change in its character and direction; a need to revise gunnery programs and courses; an improvement in training center equipment; officers' personal gear and equipment; and a number of other questions.

Work is under way on the majority of suggestions. Much already has been done and is being done. For example, organizational-methods instructions on combat training based on 1988 experience were made known to the troops by 20 October to ensure timely, qualitative planning. This made it possible to complete planning calmly and thoughtfully in military districts and groups of forces before 10 November and in formations and units before the end of November. Thus everything for these indicators was ready a month before the beginning of the training year. These questions also were resolved in a similar manner last year.



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Existing combat training programs *grant a certain independence to commanders*. This permits them to draw up real combat training plans with consideration of subordinates' training level and local conditions. On the whole, preliminary results of 1989 training show that this system justifies itself.

Comrade A. I. Vladimirov and some of the letters' authors suggest planning upward from below, i.e., from company to district, which in our view is *inadvisable*. This is explained by many reasons, including by the need to plan the operation of training fields, training centers and training classrooms downward from above. Experience has shown that only with centralized planning can proper, effective use of the training facility be assured.

In addition, we must concentrate all attention on creating favorable conditions for work and duty of the company or battery commander above all. At the present time, if he is to hold a weapon training class with firing, he is forced to decide numerous questions with all regimental services within 24 hours. But in a good unit it must be organized as follows: on arriving at the firing range the company commander receives a report from the range commandant that the sector is ready for firing, the range guard has been posted, ammunition can be drawn, training stations are prepared, and duty services are in their place, and he immediately begins the class.

It is common knowledge that tactical exercises are held with companies and battalions *twice a year for each*, half of them with field firing. Regimental and divisional tactical exercises are held alternately *once every two years*. In accordance with combat training programs, battalion field problems lasting 5-6 days are held prior to battalion, regimental and divisional tactical exercises. Steps are being taken to improve the quality of exercises, and the establishment of special training centers equipped with laser fire and hit simulators is envisaged. Work is being done to update the gunnery courses as new equipment is received; it is planned to complete this work in 1995. Much is being done to create conditions promoting qualitative mission accomplishment. *Meanwhile, I would like to draw the attention of commanders at all levels to the need to engage seriously in combat and political training.* We speak much about improving the effectiveness of every class, that we have to bring the content and direction of training into full conformity with demands of the USSR Minister of Defense, and that we have to put an end to disruption of combat training plans and rhythm, to the separation of personnel from classes, to indulgences, to oversimplification, and to stereotypes. But many omissions still are encountered in realizing these matters. As a result the above requirements remain only appeals. Just what is the matter? Well, it is that the very level which ensures that theory is embodied in practice (regiment-battalion-company) did not function. This must be organized by the regimental or separate battalion commander together with subordinate officers and warrant officers. No one will do this for them. All other commanders and officers in charge can only help, create conditions, support and so on, but no

one should interfere with the regimental commander in maintaining regulation order and strictly fulfilling the order of the day, let alone the combat training plan or class schedule. The latter must become an inviolable law altogether.

Now when units are being reorganized (reorganized and redesignated; inactivated; restationed and so on), a difficult situation is created for some of them. But high results can be achieved even under these conditions if desired. Many regiments of the Transbaykal Military District can serve as confirmation of this.

But in our view *it makes no sense to change the existing system* with respect to conducting combat readiness classes. At the present time, as we know, they are held at the beginning of each training period, i.e., *twice a year*, taking into account the existing system of calling up young replacements. It must be borne in mind that any commander also can hold additional combat readiness classes should he deem it necessary.

**The role of officers and warrant officers** in the life of the Armed Forces always has been decisive, and now the importance of the officer corps unquestionably has grown. This was caused by the course set toward a priority of qualitative parameters in defense organizational development, by measures taken to reduce the Army, by the ambiguity of the sociopolitical situation in the country, and by an aggravation of the ethnic question, which in turn leaves an imprint on the service of privates and NCO's. These problems can be resolved in the Armed Forces, and specifically as spelled out by CPSU policy, only through common efforts of officers and warrant officers. Cadre policy in turn also must improve. The USSR Ministry of Defense resolutely supports thinking, energetic people, those capable of self-critically assessing the state of affairs, quickly getting rid of formalism and stereotypes in work, and finding new original solutions, people who can and wish to go boldly forward and who are able to achieve success in short time periods.

Efficiency-report boards presently have been established and are permanently functioning in all formations and units and in various military establishments. All questions connected with advancement, reassignment, officer awards, and regular promotions are examined publicly, comprehensively and objectively. This process is being democratized to the maximum extent. A broad set of measures for further strengthening the corps of regular cadre also is being implemented and the corps is being promptly augmented by fresh forces. Specialist training and utilization are improving. An active search is going on for new approaches in working with officer cadres. The chief factor is orientation on an individual approach to every officer and warrant officer.

Meanwhile, it is impossible not to see and react to negative sentiments in some officers which affect their attitude toward service and the performance of assigned missions. They are caused by imperfection of the TO&E structure of

some formations and units, by lack of objectivity in assessing the results of work, by unwarranted leveling in pay and so on. Many social problems are being discussed.

It is not surprising that not very long ago there was a very acute question of social justice and material welfare of officers and warrant officers, protection of rights and dignity, and guaranteed provision of housing both when performing service and after discharge from the Armed Forces. *The conduct of the Main Military Council and the speech there by Supreme Commander M. S. Gorbachev immediately removed a large group of problems.*

The decision was made for swiftest conclusion of work on the draft Law on Defense, the draft Statute on Performance of Military Duty by Officers, and certain other legislative acts defining the basis of Armed Forces organization and development as well as servicemen's rights and obligations. They will reflect processes of democratization and glasnost and will provide measures for strengthening officers' social protection and the procedure of alternation of duty in different climatic and territorial zones and different positions.

In speaking about an important problem such as *providing housing for officers and warrant officers*, it must be noted that the USSR Minister of Defense decided to expand housing construction significantly. In this connection other kinds of construction have been restricted to the maximum or stopped altogether in the Armed Forces. Every military district and fleet commander and all construction entities received categorical directions from the Minister of Defense to concentrate maximum personnel and equipment on housing construction. It must be noted that during 1989-1990 alone over 100 80-apartment houses will be built for servicemen discharged to the reserve in connection with the reduction in the Armed Forces in addition to those envisaged by the plan. It is important to emphasize that by USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree of 21 March 1989, local Soviets of People's Deputies are ordered to take appropriate steps to provide living space to officers, warrant officers and extended-term servicemen discharged to the reserve or retirement. The question of granting benefits to servicemen on joining housing construction cooperatives regardless of place and period of service or time of upcoming discharge also is being considered.

Simultaneously the USSR Minister of Defense has assigned the task of planning housing construction for officers who are discharged in remote areas and in the middle zone. In addition, one other variant is being studied: without revoking the officer's state apartment support, to study the possibility of deducting a certain sum from pay (at his desire) on account for guaranteed allocation of an apartment in a chosen region of the country after discharge to the reserve.

Meeting officers' wishes halfway, the Statute on Performance of Military Service being drawn up provides an opportunity to discharge officers to the reserve after ten years of service (by desire).

**NCO's and privates.** The time has come when it is necessary to precisely define the status of performance of duty by NCO's and privates and clarify their rights and obligations. All these questions now are being studied and will be reflected in the Statute on Performance of Compulsory-Term Service for this category of servicemen.

I fully agree with the opinion of many officers that the private or NCO must have not a purely nominal pay (as now), but a salary which will permit him to feel like a full-fledged member of society. It cannot be forgotten that compulsory-term servicemen are people in the age of active labor activity and limiting them to the range of 7-15 rubles means infringing on their dignity (20-30 kopecks per day).

**NCO's.** It is necessary to significantly elevate their authority, thereby enabling us to give them an opportunity to perform their duties better and motivate their work. I agree with readers who believe that it is advisable to select candidates for training subunits back in the school, vocational-technical school, and military commissariat, and not after six months' service in the Army. They must be sent to the training subunits immediately and after completion of training they are promoted or not promoted to sergeant depending on success. The best trained can be assigned to vacant warrant officer positions. The best trained could be given initial officer rank at the end of service after study in short courses.

On the whole, many suggestions that came in on improving the work of officers, warrant officers, NCO's and privates merit the most serious attention.

Legislatively fixed mutual obligations and responsibility of the USSR citizen who has voluntarily chosen the officer profession and of the state in the person of the Armed Forces and its other entities must become the basis for elevating the qualitative makeup of the Soviet officer corps and changing the attitude toward one's official duties. The officer's responsibility to the state must be secured by appropriate guarantees, and specifically by observance of officers' rights and equality before the law regardless of their official position, by a clear perspective of performance of duty and professional growth, by social protection, by moral and financial incentives, and by benefits for the officer and his family as applicable to the character and specifics of military service.

**A special role rests with the strengthening of military discipline under present-day conditions, when it is so important to raise the Armed Forces' qualitative indicators.** The slightest deviations from existing demands and standards, let alone a display of carelessness, irresponsibility, sloppiness or negligence inevitably exert a negative influence on the quality of training soldiers and on combat readiness of the unit as a whole. Firm, conscious discipline acts as a necessary condition, means and guarantee of the success of perestroika and renewal of military life. Firm means that all unit personnel fulfill all provisions of the USSR Constitution and Soviet laws,

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the demands of military regulations as well as the orders of commanders and officers in charge precisely and implicitly. But like the unit commander, officers, warrant officers, NCO's and privates are citizens of our state with equal rights. Each bears responsibility to the people for the Motherland's security. Therefore he must fulfill orders and provisions of regulations not mechanically, but by deeply delving into their essence and understanding the reason why they are issued or entered in the regulation. Let us take a simple example. Compulsory-term privates and NCO's are prohibited from leaving the unit area without authorization (if there is a need or desire to go or travel somewhere, it is necessary to receive permission from the commander). When a person goes AWOL in the subunit, a search begins for the reasons. The following are named among them: the company interior detail did not perform duty vigilantly, the traffic regulating detail and patrol around the military post are performing their duties poorly, the post has poor barriers and so on. One might ask: What fence can stop a soldier if he decided to go AWOL from the unit? And is it ethical to create fortress walls around military posts? The fact is, servicemen are not prisoners and the population around does not consist of enemies. To the contrary, the personnel are performing an honorable duty and all around are near and dear. But there must be order in the unit. A military unit in any state cannot be compared with any other state establishment—it must be able to function at any moment. All this must be brought to each serviceman's awareness. The subunit and unit commander and especially the deputy commander for political affairs are responsible for this. Our system and our methods are effective, only active work is needed.

Recently the activation of work to strengthen military discipline permitted somewhat of a reduction in the number of incidents and crimes and achievement of greater discipline and cohesiveness of military collectives. At the same time the chief task set by the CPSU Central Committee of ensuring its fundamental improvement still has not been accomplished. Moreover, it must be stated that while crime has dropped in the Army environment in recent years through the joint efforts of the command authority, political entities and military justice, this process now has practically been suspended. There has been an increased number of crimes committed because of drunkenness, and instances of evading military service have increased considerably, but the increased frequency of instances of misappropriation of weapons and ammunition are especially troubling.

All these serious shortcomings in military discipline are the result above all of slow perestroika in the practical activity of command and political cadres. It obviously has not yet touched the lower levels. The center of gravity has not shifted to where NCO's and privates perform duty and where the military collective forms. Much is said about this and people are judging how best to solve this problem,

but they are progressing very slowly. It is necessary to learn to speak less and to teach people more about how to arrange upbringing work correctly in the subunit and help company officers above all.

The following can be singled out among problems which must be resolved in the interests of strengthening military discipline: assurance of strict regulation order in every unit and subunit and an improvement in the style of troop leadership. We must completely eliminate a formal inspector's inclination from the activity of all command and control entities. There is the Main Military Inspectorate in the USSR Ministry of Defense which is obligated to inspect in establishing the real capabilities of corresponding units, formations, and large strategic formations and the abilities of their commanders. And by monitoring, everyone else must help and take part in the process of training and upbringing. In so doing it is necessary to increase the effectiveness of upbringing work in every way and implement its fundamental turn toward people. Most important, we need to support the officers' deciding role in strengthening military discipline. The solution to this problem lies in getting as close as possible to the personnel. This can be done very quickly and with good results if individual work is organized with each NCO and private. A company officer (especially the deputy company commander for political affairs) simply is obligated to speak one-on-one with each private and NCO, and not formally, but openly and sincerely, after which even the most undisciplined soldier would ponder his further service.

Of course, individual upbringing work will produce results only together with other measures. People in each unit and subunit must observe regulation order, everyone must precisely fulfill the order of the day, and classes unquestionably must be held strictly according to schedule.

**I would like to dwell in particular on criteria for evaluating the status of military discipline.** Presently it is evaluated basically according to the number of extraordinary incidents. If there is no extraordinary incident, everything is normal! If there is, military discipline is evaluated as unsatisfactory, and no high state of combat and mobilization readiness will permit the unit to receive an overall good evaluation any longer. One should have proceeded above all from the level of combat and mobilization readiness and combat and political training, the status and effectiveness of political indoctrination work, and how the organization of life and routine conforms to regulation requirements in determining the state of military discipline at the level up to and including division.

A record of the number of crimes and incidents is necessary at the corps-army-district (group of forces) level, since without this it is impossible to perform a full, comprehensive analysis of legal infractions, determine the most typical ones for a given large strategic formation, uncover the reasons for and trends in their development by kinds of crime, and develop measures for



eliminating it and preventing incidents. In addition, it is also necessary to eliminate a situation where a military unit commander, who is an investigative agency, performs mutually exclusive duties: he fights crime and simultaneously is responsible for the state of military discipline and law and order. This is inadmissible, since it generates a desire to cover up crimes, incidents and infractions by appointed persons.

Yes, an officer has to be responsible for the state of discipline in his entrusted military collective, but only to the extent to which he personally is guilty by not having fulfilled the entire set of preventive measures prescribed by regulations, orders and statutes. Indiscriminate punishments of officers do not contribute to eliminating a cover-up of incidents and crimes. It is important for us that everyone understand that the basis of an evaluation of work to strengthen military discipline must not be formal statistical indicators, but commanders' strict fulfillment of laws and military regulations and full use of powers to impose and maintain regulation order. The chief task is to prevent law infractions. We must ensure the inevitability of responsibility for each infraction of military discipline.

*Suggestions for relieving combat units of fatigue work and relieving the Army in general of performing missions not inherent to it holds a special place in the discussion. This would eliminate many problems, including in matters of strengthening military discipline, for it is no secret that where strenuous, precisely organized combat training goes on, there is no place for laxity and infractions.*

With respect to fatigue work in units, there is something to think about here; perhaps we should undertake to establish special subunits or increase the number of employees for work involving maintenance of complex unit administrative and support services and unit barracks and housing. Speaking about the problem in general (relieving the Army of accomplishing national economic tasks), this largely depends on the state of the country's economy.

In conclusion I would like to note that the processes of perestroika in the Army have assumed an irreversible character. Today much is changing for us, changing for the better. At the same time, we must realize that the Soviet Armed Forces will accomplish their missions to the full extent only if every person—general, admiral, officer, warrant officer, NCO, private and seaman—becomes imbued with a feeling of personal responsibility for the state of affairs in his assigned sector and if he does not await directions from above, but works strenuously in the interests of perestroika and of strengthening the USSR's defensive capability.

#### Footnotes

\*Conclusion. See VOYENNAYA MYSL, No 2, 1990.

## FIELD GENERALS AND MILITARY LEADERS OF THE SOVIET MILITARY SCHOOL

### Flag Officer of the Arctic

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No 3, Mar 90 (signed to press 28 Feb 90)  
pp 64-71—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Admiral P. N. Navoytsev and Captain 1st Rank A. P. Aristov]

[Text] Northern Fleet Commander Rear Admiral<sup>1</sup> Arseniy Grigoryevich Golovko celebrated his 35th birthday in the flag command center: it was the second day of the war. An avalanche of urgent and pressing matters came down on the Fleet commander, who was young both in age and in time in position (as of 7 August 1940).

Becoming a fleet commander at age 34 is an unusual event, but at that time it was fully natural. The late 1920's and the 1930's were a time of rapid organizational development of the Navy and just as rapid growth of talented, determined, purposeful young commanders dedicated to the Motherland and in love with fleet service.

Arseniy Grigoryevich came to the Navy in 1925 on a Komsomol levy from the Moscow Agricultural Academy imeni K. A. Timiryazev. Red Navy man, naval school cadet, watch officer, navigator and mine officer aboard ships of various types, division mine officer of destroyers, Instructor of the RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] Navy command courses, Flag Mine Specialist of a minesweeping and minelaying brigade, Chief of Staff of a detachment and brigade of motor torpedo boats, Commander of a brigade of motor torpedo boats and of a division of destroyers, Adviser to the Commander of the Cartagena Naval Base, Chief of Staff of the Northern Fleet, and Commander of the Caspian and Amur naval flotillas—those are Golovko's career steps in the Black Sea, Baltic, Pacific and Northern fleets and on the Caspian and Amur until his appointment to the position of Fleet Commander. Back in his cadet years in 1927 Golovko joined the Communist Party, in whose ranks he developed into a convinced patriot of the Motherland. "The party reared me for 13 years before advancing me to the position of Northern Fleet commander," Golovko would write later in his memoirs.<sup>2</sup>

By 1940 he already had both abundant practical experience and diverse theoretical knowledge gained in the Naval School imeni M. V. Frunze (1928), at the Advanced Command Courses (1931) and in the Naval Academy (1938). But as life shows, knowledge of military affairs and practical experience alone are not always enough to become an outstanding military leader. The path to command heights is dubious without appropriate moral-volitional and personality qualities. It can be said that Golovko fully conformed to his first command roles in the Navy. So as not to make this an unsubstantiated



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assertion we will quote several excerpts from an efficiency report of prewar times kept in his personal file: "Possesses great strength of will, very energetic, very persistent and with initiative. Has great official tact. Disciplined... Very able-bodied and hardy... Has a fully settled, specific, firm, determined character... Very energetic, great initiative, and very decisive in performing official duties; sharp, very disciplined, industrious, and punctual... Superb naval training."<sup>3</sup>

Golovko's moral and professional qualities were revealed most vividly in the Great Patriotic War. N. G. Kuznetsov wrote: "Admiral Golovko was one of the most educated military leaders of our Navy and enjoyed great authority.... The successful Fleet operations in the North are the best efficiency report for the commander."<sup>4</sup>

But the path to success was thorny. Neither Fleet forces nor their basing system nor the level of personnel combat training corresponded to the demands presented and missions assigned when Golovko was appointed commander in 1940. Judge for yourselves.

The Fleet was assigned the following missions: destruction of the enemy fleet in the Barents and White seas; submarine cruising operations off the west coast of Norway and even in the Skagerrak; joint defense of the Sredniy, Rybachi and Kola peninsulas with the troops; assisting troops in operations on a coastal axis. Could these missions be accomplished by the 15 submarines, eight destroyers, seven patrol ships, two minesweepers, one minelayer, 14 small subhunters and 116 aircraft in the Northern Fleet order of battle? Moreover, almost half of the surface combatants were either of prerevolutionary construction or had been refitted from vessels of civilian departments. The ships which took part in the Soviet-Finnish War needed repair. The aircraft pool consisted basically of aircraft of obsolete types. The airfield and ship basing system was poorly developed. There were insufficient depot installations and production capacities of ship repair yards. Combat training of submarines, the Fleet's main striking force, was permitted only in water areas whose depths did not exceed normal operating depth, but there were almost no such places in the Barents Sea.

There were many problems and extremely little time for resolving them. Realizing this, the commander focused all his will and uncommon organizing abilities on attaining the chief objective of increasing Fleet forces' combat readiness in a short time period. He consciously undertook a temporary decrease in the established strength of the Fleet combat nucleus: he ordered those ships which had used up their service life to be urgently put up for repairs and he demanded that formation commanders conduct combat training without conditionalities. The commander rarely sat around his office in the last peacetime months. During this time he visited essentially all units and formations, thoroughly studied the theater, often put to sea, and took a personal part in choosing locations for airfields and shore batteries, which he was trying to construct on an accelerated basis

to increase the firepower of Fleet defense. The trip gave Arseniy Grigoryevich an opportunity to study in detail the state of affairs locally, the professional qualities of ship commanders and the personnel's moral-political state and to promptly give necessary help and remedy shortcomings in the forces' combat readiness.

A detailed knowledge of his job, determined day-to-day work, high culture and personal charm permitted Golovko to win authority in the Fleet in a short time. In his command and control activity he never abused the principle of sole command to the detriment of collective leadership and, to the contrary, he never tried to "take refuge" in a decision of the military council or higher command in a difficult situation.

Constant monitoring of fulfillment of orders issued, trust in those executing them, and work to his utmost—Arseniy Grigoryevich adhered strictly to this formula of leadership activity. By the beginning of the war that style of organizational work permitted introducing a large number of ships to the Fleet's combat nucleus, considerably increasing the combat effectiveness of Fleet forces, and preparing them to conduct independent combat operations and joint combat operations with ground forces both in the continental and in the maritime theater.

Only now have we begun to understand how difficult it was for military leaders of that time to "remedy deficiencies" whose causes often were dictated by the political course and "ideological guidelines" of the higher echelon of the country's leadership. This required not only professional expertise, but also uncommon civic courage to act in conformity with circumstances at hand, at times contrary to instructions from above, risking being tagged "provocateur," "panic-monger" and so on with all consequences stemming therefrom.

Golovko belonged to the category of military leaders who always were guided by common sense and who placed interests of the Motherland's defense above concern for one's personal career and well-being. This can be confirmed by the following fact. Violations of air space by "unknown" aircraft which clearly were conducting reconnaissance became more frequent in the North as well as in other border areas of the USSR in March 1941. An order came from the People's Commissariat of the Navy: "Do not open fire, try to force them to land using fighters, report violations to the Main Naval Staff after having carefully checked the correctness of the report." Such vagueness of orders had a negative effect on people's mood, it damped their ardor and it reduced subunits' combat readiness. As a result not one air defense battery opened fire on a German aircraft which flew over the Fleet main base of Polyarnyy, over Kola Bay and over the airfield at Vayenga on 17 June 1941, although the Fleet commander already had issued orders to shoot down air space violators. Golovko traveled to the batteries to learn the reasons and saw that an "inhibition mechanism" had functioned which had been created in the awareness of many by an exaggeration of the thesis

"Don't give in to provocation, don't give cause for incidents." It was necessary to urgently break that mechanism. Arseniy Grigoryevich visited the batteries together with Military Council Member A. A. Nikolayev and conducted necessary work for a sharp increase in combat readiness.

After the war Golovko frankly admitted that **"this was the most serious test which life arranged for me personally as a military leader."**<sup>5</sup> He passed it with honor.

**Golovko's ability to foresee the course of development of the military-political situation essentially reduced to naught the operational surprise of the enemy attack on Fleet ships, installations and bases.** The forward movement of fascist German troops to the Soviet border in mid-June and the increased intensity of flights by their aircraft over our territory attested more and more distinctly that the beginning of war was a matter of the next few days. No one announced anything definite in response to the Fleet commander's queries about the situation. Then Arseniy Grigoryevich Golovko began to act independently as demanded by the situation and as intuition suggested. He made a bold decision: on 17 June, before receiving an official order from the People's Commissariat of the Navy, he shifted the Fleet to Operational Readiness No 2. On 19 June he ordered that submarines be dispersed and prepared for putting to sea. That same day he reported a plan to the Main Naval Staff for deploying submarines to the most probable area of German sea lanes in case of war. When the order came for shifting fleets to Operational Readiness No 1, the Northern Fleet essentially already was in it. Thanks to vigorous steps undertaken by Golovko, 122 vessels of civilian departments (instead of the 65 previously envisaged by the plan) were mobilized and armed in a short time period, which substantially increased the Fleet's order of battle in special purpose ships and auxiliary vessels.

**Arseniy Grigoryevich was characterized by a striving to tie together the entire set of missions facing both Fleet forces as well as troops operating on the coastal axis.** Therefore he constantly carefully watched the situation both in the maritime and in the continental theaters of military operations. He always strived to establish close personal contacts with the command authority of the front operating on the coastal axis in order to know its needs for Fleet assistance in more detail and to take fuller account of them where possible in distributing forces by missions. Such mutual relations strengthened combat friendship and helped accomplish the common job of defeating the enemy more efficiently and better.

It is common knowledge that the enemy was halted on the Murmansk axis in the first months of the war. The front here finally stabilized in early October 1941, with much of the credit also going to Northern Fleet forces. From the very first days of warfare in the Arctic Golovko concentrated the Fleet's main efforts on air and artillery support to 14th Army units and on transporting troops, combat equipment, ammunition and food. In 1941 alone the 12th Special Naval Infantry Brigade, the 125th and

126th rifle regiments, a reserve regiment for the defense of Polyarnyy, and the 69th Fougasse-Mortar Company were activated from personnel of ships and shore units and were immediately sent to the front as they became ready. During June-December 1941 Fleet aviation flew 1,348 sorties and ships made 63 combat sorties for giving fire support to the troops.

In July 1941, when fascist German forces were trying to surmount the defense line on the Zapadnaya Litsa River and penetrate to Murmansk no matter what, at the Fleet command authority's initiative several tactical assault forces and reconnaissance and raiding parties were landed which disorganized enemy offensive operations and forced him to remove troops from the front to protect the rears. West German historian W. Hess, who researched combat operations of the fascist Norway Mountain Jäger Corps in 1941, wrote that **"the initiative was in the hands of Soviet forces for a long time thanks to the assault force landings."**<sup>6</sup>

**A characteristic trait of Admiral Golovko's naval leadership art was the ability to single out methods by which the enemy conducted combat operations and take skillful account of them in his decisions.** For example, in the first days of the war a considerable part of the merchant and fishing fleets (155 vessels) was massed in Kola Bay. To avoid losses from enemy air strikes the vessels had to be urgently rebased into the White Sea, but there were insufficient forces for convoying them. A solution to this difficult situation nevertheless was found. Based on the experience of war in Spain, Golovko knew that the Germans were inclined to operate in a stereotyped manner. He began to carefully study the regime of enemy aircraft flights and noticed that they usually made raids at the very same hours. Then Arseniy Grigoryevich made a daring, unusual decision which seemed to go contrary to the canons of naval art: to send the vessels off one by one without escort in the periods between raids and at various intervals, and to deliver strikes against enemy airfields to divert his attention. Fighter aviation was assigned the mission of precluding flights by enemy reconnaissance aircraft over these vessels' transit routes. It was risky of course, but the calculation was built on a knowledge of enemy tactics, on precise observance of the procedure and time periods of the transit, and on consideration of camouflaging weather factors (low clouds, fog), and it was supported by combat operations which diverted the enemy's attention and so was fully justified: all vessels crossed into the White Sea without losses in three days. The cited example is merely one feature in the portrait of A. G. Golovko, naval leader.

**Arseniy Grigoryevich's practical activity throughout the war was combined with a search for new forms and methods of conducting naval warfare which permitted most complete realization of such fundamental principles of the naval art as massing of forces, coordination, and surprise.**

It is at times difficult for historians and biographers to figure out what bit a particular military leader contributed to development of the military art and where his "I"

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was manifested in the mass of combat documents drawn up by the staff and signed by the commander. Fortunately, Golovko's "I" can be traced from his diary, in which he not only registered facts from Fleet life (although not regularly—the situation did not always permit), but also analyzed combat operations, reflected on reasons for failures and outlined steps to remedy them. Here is an entry from 22 December 1941: "A half-year of war. Hitler promised the Germans to end the war in a maximum of 10 months. It is clear that nothing came of it.... Now the question is when we will smash them." And in the same place: "The Germans are building up antisubmarine warfare forces. One has to believe that in the next few days or ... weeks the activities of our submarines will be hampered."

Golovko's concern was not accidental. In the first period of the war submarines were the chief striking force for accomplishing the important operational mission of battle on enemy sea lines of communication over which fascist German forces in Norway were supplied and strategic raw materials—nickel and iron ore—were transported to Germany.

With profound realization of the exceptional importance of the mission of disrupting these shipments, Arseniy Grigoryevich constantly sought the most sensible and effective ways of accomplishing it. For example, while the battle on enemy lines of communication was conducted chiefly in the form of *systematic combat operations* during 1941-1943, an even more effective form, the *naval operation*, was used in 1944. It facilitated the concentration of mixed forces in necessary areas for a certain period and more thorough organization of their coordination. *Methods of employing type and mixed forces were improved* in conducting systematic combat operations [boyevyye deystviya] and carrying out operations [operatsii]. For example, during 1941-1942 submarines conducted combat operations on lines of communication basically singly by the passive loitering method. The submarine would depart to another area for the time of charging the storage battery and her combat position remained unmonitored for a lengthy time. To eliminate this shortcoming, continuous manning of one position by 2-3 submarines (which occupied it in turn) was introduced as of 1943, and periodic massing of submarines (up to 6-10) in a limited area with their vectoring to enemy convoys by reconnaissance aircraft was introduced as of the end of the year.

Often the authors of writings about military leaders place the emphasis on successes of army or navy forces achieved under their leadership and as a rule are silent about what blood they cost. The fact is, however, that the price of victory is a criterion of no small importance in assessing the generalship or admiralship art of a military leader and his humanistic qualities. For Golovko the loss of a ship or aircraft was not simply a loss of combat equipment, but above all the death of people and a tragedy. And he did everything dependent on him to see that there were as few unjustified losses as possible. Here are a few excerpts from his diary: "1 July 1942. The

'M-176' and 'D-3' do not answer the call.... Submarine commanders in the brigade are in low spirits. It is necessary to rethink all the combat work of our submarines. We have to take a look around, possibly we are overlooking a great deal.... The Germans have undertaken some kind of ASW steps which we have not established, that is clear. We have to find out specifically which ones.... 9 September 1942. The 'K-2' does not answer. Apparently there are many mines at this position.... I ordered that no more submarines be sent to this position for now."

But war is war: there are no combat operations without losses, even if the command authority does take every step to prevent them, but they must not be in vain. An intensification of Northern Fleet submarine activities in the very first months of the war was reflected substantially in the operational situation on the Murmansk axis. This was even admitted by the German High Command, which noted in one of the directives (September 1941) that the enemy's disruption of sea lines of communication in the Arctic had limited even more the capability of carrying out operation plans of the mountain rifle corps of still reaching Murmansk this year.<sup>7</sup>

The impression may form that Golovko made a fetish of submarines in naval warfare. This is not so. He relied on employment of mixed fleet forces in accomplishing any mission. For example, at a conference of the Navy's higher leadership personnel back in December 1940, Arseniy Grigoryevich expressed concern that we were devoting insufficient attention to torpedo bombing by Naval Aviation aircraft, while experience of the first year of the world war showed the high effectiveness of the method of employing aircraft torpedo weapons against naval targets, and he proposed having air torpedo units as part of the fleets.

But this idea was implemented only two years later—there were no aircraft. The first mine-torpedo and attack air regiments appeared in the Northern Fleet only by mid-1943, which immediately affected results of combat operations. For example, while Fleet aircraft did not sink a single ship in 1941 and they sank four (9,900 tons) in 1942, they already sank 21 vessels (58,432 tons) in 1943. Strike aviation destroyed a total of 74 vessels with an overall tonnage of 178,546 through October 1944 (as a comparison, submarines sank 59 vessels with a cumulative displacement of 184,475 tons in the war years). As we see, Golovko's orientation toward joint, active operations of mixed fleet forces on lines of communication already was contributing to a fundamental turning point in the battle on enemy sea lines of communication by the end of 1943, which permitted reducing to a minimum the export of strategic raw materials from the Arctic to Germany and substantially hampering supply of the maritime fascist German force grouping by sea.

Defense of sea lines of communication, which had a national economic and military significance on a state-wide scale, was another principal mission of the Northern Fleet, but its successful accomplishment was complicated by a number of circumstances. *First of all,*



before the war military specialists believed that maritime transportation ties with overseas countries would cease almost completely and sea lines of communication would have a secondary importance in connection with the continental nature of a future war. Therefore hardly any attention was given to organizing their defense in prewar years. *Secondly*, in the very first months of the war the Northern Fleet had to defend lines of communication in two sectors: western (external lines of communication) and eastern (internal lines of communication). *Thirdly*, their defense had to be organized and constructed comprehensively against strikes of the air, surface and undersea enemy.

Under such conditions it was difficult to reliably ensure security of maritime shipping within the scope of the primary form of employment of naval forces—systematic combat operations—with the limited composition of mixed fleet forces (which moreover had no experience). Golovko and his staff found a solution: concentrate Fleet personnel and equipment for a specific period. That approach to accomplishing defense of sea lines of communication in the Arctic proved very effective: losses on internal lines of communication were only 0.43 percent and on external lines of communication 5.4 percent of the total number of vessels convoyed.<sup>8</sup> These results were achieved to a considerable extent thanks to the constant search by Golovko and his staff officers for new forms and methods of escorting convoys. For example, after the British command's failure in escorting the PQ-17 convoy, the Northern Fleet command developed and proposed to the allies new systems for escorting convoys ("trickle movement" and "twin counter convoys"). Their use considerably facilitated a sharp drop in the German surface fleet's effectiveness in fighting convoys in the winter of 1943. This enraged Hitler and he demanded that large ships be scrapped and their weapons turned over to coast defense. Grand Admiral Raeder, commander in chief of the German Navy, resigned. This episode concluded the failure of German naval theory on disrupting lines of communication using surface ships. Of course, it would have been a very, very difficult matter to successfully accomplish this mission without substantial help of allied naval forces. The Northern Fleet operated in rather close contact with the British and U.S. naval forces.

Arseniy Grigoryevich's diary entries about joint operations even appear somehow routine and everyday: "2 December 1941. The 'K-2' was replaced by 'Seawolf.' ... (British submarine)...." "16 December. Commander of the cruiser 'Kent' paid a visit. We spoke about a joint search by torpedo boats off the Norwegian coast."

Up to the end of May 1945, when the final convoy departed the USSR's northern ports for England, Golovko not only had to arrange coordination with allied naval forces, but also perform diplomatic functions to a certain extent by holding talks with representatives of the allied naval command about the extent of assistance on the part of their naval forces, and meeting and escorting highly placed persons. **Dedication to the**

**job, high professionalism, and culture earned him the respect and recognition of colleagues, including navymen of allied countries.** Their good feelings for Golovko also were preserved in the postwar period, as confirmed by the cordial reception given him during a visit to England in October 1955.

There were many examples of combat cooperation in the Arctic. There were, of course, also misunderstandings which Arseniy Grigoryevich remedied tactfully but persistently in trying to give help and support to all defenders of the Arctic (Soviet and foreign), who were fighting under severe conditions.

It was emphasized in the memoirs of N. G. Kuznetsov, former People's Commissar of the Navy, that Admiral Golovko was too sensitive for a military leader. And in this connection he recalled how, being in the Northern Fleet during the war, he expressed several critical remarks which were inoffensive from his point of view over which Arseniy Grigoryevich became very put out. He took all criticism of the Fleet as personal omissions. This episode also was reflected in Golovko's diary. He considered the criticism unjust and explained why: "I am not able to make excuses. I am unable to show what has been done in a light for all to see.... I am not able to do this. Apparently now this is a big shortcoming. Well, forget it. Actions speak for themselves. An objective evaluation will be given by people in one way or another."

In writing these words, Arseniy Grigoryevich did not play the hypocrite. His own "I" never protrudes anywhere in his memoirs. In the foreground are Fleet affairs, the work of subordinates, angry words addressed to the negligent and cowards, and a warm attitude toward people who are bold, selfless, honest and industrious.

After the war Golovko was Deputy Chief and Chief of the Main Staff and Deputy CINC of the Navy, Chief of the Navy General Staff and First Deputy Minister of the Navy, and he commanded the 4th Naval Fleet and the Baltic Fleet. In November 1956 Admiral Golovko was appointed to the post of First Deputy CINC of the Navy. He was in this position until 17 May 1962, the day of his untimely death.

The Motherland evaluated Admiral A. G. Golovko's military work on its merits: he was decorated with four orders of Lenin, four orders of Red Banner, two orders of Ushakov 1st Class, an Order of Nakhimov 1st Class, two orders of Red Star and many medals. He had awards of foreign states.

#### Footnotes

1. A. G. Golovko was promoted to vice admiral on 16 September 1941, and to admiral on 31 March 1944.
2. Golovko, A. G., "Vmeste s flotom" [Together with the Fleet], 3rd ed., Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1984, p 11.
3. TsVMA [Central Naval Archives], stack 203, list 1169, file 1, sheets 36, 54.



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4. Kuznetsov, N. G., "Na flotakh boyevaya trevoga" [General Quarters in the Fleets], Moscow, Nauka, 1971, p 226.
5. Golovko, p 17.
6. Kuznetsov, "Kursom k pobede" [On a Course Toward Victory], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1976, p 43.
7. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 12, 1959, p 80.
8. TsVMA, stack 11, file 17814, book 4, sheet 63.

## IN FOREIGN ARMIES

### U.S. Base Strategy

90UM0418J Moscow VOYENNAYA MYSL in Russian  
No 3, Mar 90 (signed to press 28 Feb 90)  
pp 72-76—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article based on foreign press materials by Lieutenant General (Retired) S. N. Sokolov]

[Text] The interest of U.S. ruling circles in preserving military bases outside the limits of the North American continent is based largely on geopolitical calculations, above all in the area of changing the balance of power in their favor. Based on this, under conditions of a reduction of armed forces and arms in Europe, the U.S. military leadership is proposing that the NATO allies "focus attention on the prior deployment of forces and the taking of other measures in areas which represent a potential for crisis." These proposals were formulated in doctrinal foreign-policy strategy documents and in concepts for the employment and operational development of armed forces.

In accordance with demands of U.S. national security strategy, which consolidated all concepts for carrying out military-coercive policy in various regions of the world, unified Armed Forces commands have been established in the European zone, on the territories of countries of the Near and Middle East and Northeast Africa, and in the zones of the Pacific Ocean, the Atlantic, and Central and South America.

**The makeup of the unified U.S. European Command** (Stuttgart, FRG) includes commands of three branches of the Armed Forces—Army, Air Force and Navy—with headquarters in the cities of Heidelberg, Ramstein and London. The unified command's zone of responsibility encompasses Western Europe, including Great Britain, Ireland, the Mediterranean littoral countries and certain states of the Near East.

The largest number of U.S. military bases and installations are in the immediate vicinity of the USSR and the other European socialist countries (see figure). Over 1,000 military installations are concentrated in the European zone and some 350,000 persons are constantly located there, which is around 30 percent of the total

U.S. Army strength and approximately 35 percent of the total order of battle of U.S. Air Force tactical aviation.

Stores of heavy weapons and equipment for five-six ground force formations have been established in Europe in case of an emergency situation. In the assessment of military specialists, this will permit deploying up to ten U.S. mechanized and armored divisions with reinforcing units with a strength up to 400,000 persons within two weeks (counting the airlift of personnel to the European theater of war).

The Sixth and Second operational fleets, which have an overall total of 200 warships including seven multipurpose aircraft carriers and 54 nuclear-powered submarines, **are kept to support combat operations in the zone of responsibility in the Mediterranean Sea and in European waters of the Atlantic.** In recent years these fleets have taken part in a number of U.S. military actions: a portion of Second Fleet personnel and equipment delivered strikes against Grenada and carried out an amphibious landing to capture territory of this country; Sixth Fleet ships and aircraft supported by U.S. Air Force combat aircraft from bases located in Great Britain delivered strikes against cities of Libya; and Marine units supported by Sixth Fleet ships conducted active combat operations in Lebanon.

The U.S. and NATO command authorities systematically hold various maneuvers and troop exercises to rehearse operations plans for fighting a war in the European theater. Annual fall maneuvers of NATO Allied Armed Forces known as "Autumn Forge" and the U.S. forces' "Reforger" exercises should be included among the largest of them. Up to 200,000 servicemen of the United States and its allied NATO bloc countries participate simultaneously in them.

The United States plans to reinforce the *southern flank* of the European theater of war with personnel and equipment of a force grouping deployed in the Indian Ocean. Its basis is one carrier force and approximately 15 warships from the Sixth and Seventh operational fleets. Auxiliary ships loaded with heavy weapons, spare parts and supply items of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade and of Army and Air Force subunits are constantly located at Diego Garcia Island to increase mobility in building up combat power and to reinforce the U.S. Armed Forces grouping in the Indian Ocean zone. The amount of cargo is figured for 30 days of combat operations.

**The Pentagon includes 19 states of the Near and Middle East as well as of Northeast Africa in the zone of operational responsibility of the U.S. Armed Forces Central Command [OTsK].\*** It is based on the Rapid Deployment Force, located in the continental United States with a strength of around 300,000 persons.


Having declared the Near and Middle East a zone of its "vital interests," the United States is constructing and modernizing new bases and installations at accelerated

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Principal U.S. military bases on foreign territories



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rates on those routes which support the Rapid Deployment Force's movement into this zone. Construction continues on a multi-purpose military base on Diego Garcia Island and modernization and construction of installations is concluding on the territory of Oman as well as of Somalia and Kenya. To rehearse elements of operations plans, the U.S. Armed Forces command conducts an annual exercise in this area code-named "Bright Star", in which national armed forces of certain Arab countries take part.

**The U.S. Armed Forces unified Pacific Command's** influence takes in the waters of the Pacific Ocean west of the shores of South and North America, the Far East, Southeast Asia, the Bering Sea and parts of the Arctic and Indian oceans. Operational command and control of Army and Navy forces is exercised through U.S. Armed Forces commands in South Korea, in Japan and in the Hawaiian Islands (Western Command). At the present time this U.S. Armed Forces grouping numbers some 500,000 persons, over 180 warships, and around 1,000 combat aircraft. A considerable portion of Army and Navy forces are on the territories of Japan and South Korea in the immediate vicinity of the Soviet Far East. The U.S. command sets aside a special role in this region for forces of the Seventh and Third operational fleets, which include the latest nuclear-powered missile submarines, aircraft carriers, battleships, missile cruisers, and various warships with cruise missiles.

U.S. military bases and installations in this region are situated throughout the waters of the Pacific Ocean from Alaska to Australia. There are over 120 U.S. bases and installations in the Japanese Islands, approximately 130 in South Korea, over 30 in the Philippines, and around 70 on other territories. The Pentagon also is taking steps to restore bases located in countries of Southeast Asia which were used by U.S. forces in the period of the aggressive war against peoples of Indochina.

Relying on numerous military bases in this region, the United States together with its allies systematically holds major exercises and maneuvers in this area of the world on a planned basis during which methods of conducting various operations by coalition groupings of armed forces are checked. Special attention here is given to rehearsing options of combat operations in the initial period of war in the Far East. The annual "Team Spirit" maneuvers held by armed forces of the United States and South Korea on the Korean Peninsula and in water areas adjoining it should be included among the largest exercises. According to foreign press announcements, the basic objective of these measures is to rehearse elements of operations plans in a war against North Korea. As a rule, over 200,000 servicemen of both armies, and formations and units of the Seventh Operational Fleet and the U.S. Pacific Air Forces participate in them.

The Pentagon held the largest maneuvers in the Pacific in history in the fall of 1989 with the involvement of all Asiatic-Pacific states maintaining allied relationships with Washington to demonstrate military power. The maneuvers were code-named PACEX and unfolded in the waters which include areas adjoining the Aleutian Islands, Sea of Okhotsk, Sea of Japan and South China Sea. Organizers of these "war games" tested the requirements of U.S. naval strategy in practice and determined the role and place of each of Washington's allies in it. On the American side, carrier forces from the Third and Seventh fleets, a large formation of warships, ground forces (up to three divisions), and over 500 aircraft including strategic bombers were involved in Exercise PACEX. American force elements stationed both in the continental United States as well as at Pentagon bases in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and in the Hawaiian and Mariana islands took part in the maneuvers. According to a foreign press announcement, the PACEX scenario provided for a "blockade" of Kamchatka, "occupation" of the Aleutian Islands, "capture" of the Kurile Islands, rehearsal of elements of an operation to establish total control over the Sea of Okhotsk and Sea of Japan, the "defense" of South Korea and Japan with subsequent launching of a counteroffensive, and support of supremacy of the United States and its allies on Pacific lines of communication.

Joint exercises of armed forces of the United States, the Philippines and Thailand also are held on a regular basis. Numerous opposed-forces exercises of the U.S. Armed Forces with allies take place essentially in all areas of the Asiatic-Pacific region. They are often held to exert pressure, for example, on Vietnam, Cambodia, the Philippines, New Zealand and other countries. It was in this spirit that a U.S. exercise was held near the Philippines to exert pressure on Manila. As a result an "agreement was reached" for U.S. Armed Forces' use of Philippine bases of Subic Bay and Clark Field for the next three years, which "opened" the path to talks on concluding a new U.S.-Philippine base treaty.

The number of U.S.-Japanese exercises which rehearse elements of blockade operations in the zone of international straits, fleet operations to defend sea lines of communication in a 1,000-nm zone off the shores of Japan, as well as the coordination of ground forces and aviation in its northern areas has increased noticeably in recent years.

U.S. military-political activeness in the Far East and in Southeast Asia is being increased within the framework of implementation of military-political concepts aimed at using allied military capabilities for changing the balance of power in the region. Preparing territories as springboards as well as drawing their armed forces into military preparations during joint exercises and maneuvers in the final account promote a growth of military danger.

Back in July 1986 the Soviet Union made specific proposals to normalize the situation in the Asiatic-Pacific region. It proposed in particular the rejection of foreign military bases in Asia and in the Pacific and the removal of forces from foreign territories, and it resolutely spoke out against U.S. attempts to extend NATO's "competence" to the entire world including Asia and the Pacific.

In the opinion of western military specialists, the U.S. **Armed Forces unified command in the Central and South American zone** (Fort Amador, Panama Canal Zone) has individual contingents of branches of the Armed Forces, earmarked chiefly for assistance to pro-American regimes in Latin America. To this end the Pentagon uses the ground forces grouping made up of the 143rd Separate Infantry Brigade (Panama), the National Guard 92nd Separate Infantry Brigade in Puerto Rico, individual army aviation subunits, Special Forces, and combat and logistic support forces. Support of ground forces in this zone is accomplished by the U.S. Air Force Southern Division and by the Navy command authority.

The U.S. armed aggression in Panama conducted in December 1989 openly confirmed the "imperial" nature of the use of armed forces for realizing the "neoglobalism" policy. Adopted by Washington as a guide to action back in the "cold war" years, under conditions of a warming of the international situation it continues to be a tool of state terrorism, of infringement on the sovereignty of an independent state, and of attempts to deprive peoples of Latin America of the right to build their lives at their own will.

U.S. establishment and maintenance of a ramified network of military bases on foreign territories and the stationing of forward armed forces groupings there (see figure) is dictated by demands of the "neoglobalism" doctrine of foreign policy strategy and by the concepts of "geographical escalation" and "low-intensity conflicts." The basic idea of the above doctrinal documents of U.S. national security strategy is the assurance of a significant U.S. presence in zones for "defense of vital U.S. interests." And this is being done at a time when the Soviet Union has proposed a reduction of the sides' naval forces, a reduction of military confrontation and the rejection of foreign military bases, but unfortunately, the USSR's proposals have not yet found full support. The question of removing a real threat, which is represented alike as "base strategy" as well as foreign military presence on foreign territories, remains in force.

#### Footnotes

\*The following are in the unified U.S. Armed Forces Central Command: Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Iran, Iraq, Yemen Arab Republic, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Qatar, Kenya, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia.

## MILITARY-SCIENTIFIC AND MILITARY-TECHNICAL INFORMATION

### Collaboration with Readers Continues

90UM0418K Moscow VOYENNAYA MYSL in Russian  
No 3, Mar 90 (signed to press 28 Feb 90)  
pp 77-78—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Individual articles by Colonel V. I. Vokhov and Colonel G. P. Nesterovich]

[Text]

### Colonel V. I. Vokhov

A readers' conference was held in November 1989 in the **Frunze Military Academy** on materials of the journal VOYENNAYA MYSL, with the Academy command authority, faculty and students taking part in the work.

The conference was opened by **Major-General V. A. Sapozhinskiy, Deputy Chief of the Academy for scientific work**, who familiarized the generals and officers with certain stages in the journal's history and named founders and authors whose works laid the foundation of Soviet military art (M. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, I. I. Vatsetis, B. M. Shaposhnikov, V. A. Antonov-Ovseyenko, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, M. V. Frunze and others). Also noted were writings deserving attention by authors from among the present Academy faculty, particularly comrades V. N. Konchits, G. D. Ionin, V. G. Chetverikov, V. D. Ryabchuk, I. N. Vorobyev, I. D. Pombrik, V. V. Khripko, V. A. Subbotin, A. F. Bulatov and O. A. Orekhov.

Officers **V. N. Andriyenko, M. M. Boroznyak, V. A. Runov, N. N. Kholodov, A. V. Budarin, V. P. Lyashenko, Yu. F. Slezkin, V. I. Usachev and V. V. Suslikov**, who spoke, analyzed journal writings which they use in the practice of training and indoctrinating students, expressed suggestions for further improving the quality of articles and the journal as a whole, and showed its role in elaborating theoretical problems of military science and in explaining CPSU military policy and Soviet government measures in defense organizational development under present-day conditions.

**Colonel A. D. Chernygov, Deputy Chief Editor of the journal**, spoke at the conference. He noted that it is especially important for the editors to know the opinion of generals and officers of the first Soviet higher military educational institution, one of the leading centers of military scientific thought, about the journal and he emphasized that the readers' conference permitted identifying the weakest points in the work and outlining methods of overcoming them. He informed the readers about the journal's plans, answered individual questions, called for active collaboration, expressed gratitude to its participants for the evaluation of the editors' work and wished everyone creative successes.



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Summing up results of the conference, **Major-General V. A. Sapozhinskiy** thanked the speakers for the suggestions and wishes made and expressed the hope that they would help raise the ideological-theoretical level of writings even more.

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#### Colonel G. P. Nesterovich

A readers' conference was held in the Moscow Military District in December 1989 on materials of VOYENNAYA MYSL. Generals and officers of the district staff and directorates took part. Conference work was directed by **District Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General L. V. Kuznetsov**. In opening the conference, he noted that district personnel worked strenuously to fulfill the tasks assigned by the USSR Minister of Defense for 1989. Primary attention of commanders, staffs and political entities was focused on further increasing the effectiveness and quality of combat training of formations and units and their combat readiness. The District's Chief of Staff emphasized that we link accomplishment of these important tasks above all with a scientific approach to organizing all troop life and activity. This is not by chance. Military affairs become increasingly complex and many-sided with each passing year, and especially now with a reduction in the USSR Armed Forces and conversion going on. At present it is already impossible to accomplish a single practical task with quality without its preliminary and detailed scientific study.

A major role rests with the military press, and especially the journal VOYENNAYA MYSL, the basic military-theoretical organ of the USSR Ministry of Defense, in the matter of comprehensively strengthening the ties of military theory with practice. After briefly covering the history of the journal's establishment and practical activity, Lieutenant-General Kuznetsov noted that experienced military leaders, authoritative military scientists, and generals and officers from the troops have appeared and are appearing today in its pages. Articles raise a wide range of pressing problems of the theory and practice of military affairs. All this contributes to an expansion of the military-political and operational-strategic outlook of Army and Navy military cadres and to a steady development of Soviet military theory.

In the opinion of the conferees, the most interesting articles published in VOYENNAYA MYSL in 1989 were considered to be those by I. N. Manzhurin (No 1), S. L. Lushchan, A. V. Zlobin (No 1), R. M. Portugalskiy (No 4), G. D. Ionin, V. G. Chetverikov (No 8), D. I. Gladkov (No 8), and I. Ye. Krupchenko (No 11). The writing by A. I. Vladimirov (No 10, 1988) and numerous responses to it attracted especially great attention of the readers.

Noting positive points in the journal's writings, **Major-Generals O. I. Kuzin, G. I. Kireyev and A. Z. Nagornyy**, and **Colonels A. S. Grachev, A. P. Kostrov, F. I. Klus, G.**

**S. Lastochkin, V. Ye. Penzev and P. N. Rovenskiy** especially stressed problems of further improving the scientific level of articles. Speakers' comments and suggestions for the journal editors on the whole are not new, but I would like to note some of them which are in keeping with the changes and processes occurring in society. Above all they are wishes to broaden writings about officer honor and about the military-patriotic and inter-ethnic upbringing of soldiers, as well as writings against those strata with pacifist sentiments who belittle and defame the Soviet Armed Forces and who stand on the position of establishing national military units right up to the Army's total disbandment.

Many speakers also noted that in a particular article's examination of questions of conducting the combined-arms battle or operation, problems of effective engagement of the enemy, ways of establishing an insurmountable defense, and combat, operational and other kinds of support somehow are lost or generally passed over in silence. The fact is, however, it is impossible to count on success without skillful resolution of these problems.

On the whole, all speakers were unanimous in saying that the journal must become a genuinely scientific and methods center for developing the concept of *perestroika* in the Army and Navy.

In conclusion **Colonel A. D. Chernygov**, Deputy Chief Editor of the journal, answered some questions, familiarized those present with the editors' work plan for the near and long terms, and thanked the conferees for attention to the journal and for the comments and suggestions for improving the content and quality of writings.

#### From the Editors' Mail

90UM0418L Moscow VOYENNAYA MYSL in Russian  
No 3, Mar 90 (signed to press 28 Feb 90)  
pp 79-80—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Colonel (Retired) I. D. Bernatskiy, candidate of military sciences, docent, and Lieutenant-Colonel A. N. Robinov]

[Text] The article by M. I. Cherednichenko entitled "Scientific Development of the Principles of Military Science"<sup>1</sup> prompted us to write a response. We cannot agree with all the theses advanced by the author. Above all the very title suggests the idea of insufficient correctness and attests to an ill-conceived handling of concepts and terms. The author does not deny the fact that in its present form military science took shape historically. This means its scientific principles also already have taken shape. In our view, Comrade Cherednichenko has a contradiction in logic here. Unfortunately, even in the subsequent content of the article one does not see sufficient argumentation of "newly" forming scientific principles of Soviet military science (which allegedly has not been done to this time).

It is generally known that science is a system of knowledge which reveals objective laws of phenomena and expresses them in abstract concepts and schemes. But in the author's opinion, "science is evaluated more actively and broadly; as a *part of society* it is measured thoroughly and systematically." The idea of the systematic "measurement" of military science is not clear, but what leads most to reflection is that, in the author's opinion, science as a form of social awareness is a part of society, i.e., a **moral category**. It is common knowledge that the assertion by K. Marx about the transformation of science into an immediate productive force of society signifies only that modern production is impossible without the introduction of scientific achievements and methods, and its subsequent growth requires development of all directions of science and conduct of theoretical research. This is to say that science, including also military science, arms society with scientifically grounded methods for improving people's effective activity and acts as a specific tool of society, but it is not part of society itself. The 19th All-Union Party Conference line that the effectiveness of Soviet defense organizational-development must be supported by military science along with military technology and the makeup of the Armed Forces does not mean at all that military science is a part of society, as the author of the article understands this.

Such categories as "armed conflict" and "war," writes Comrade Cherednichenko, are not subjects of military scientific research, they are objects of its research. The subjects of military science research must be the laws of war and armed conflict, the principles of the military art and methods of conducting military operations.

In our view, Comrade Cherednichenko introduced little that was really scientific and clear to the question of the essence and content of military science. He suggested to the readers an even more complicated content and structure of Soviet military science based on a so-called system-oriented classification. We will not begin to enumerate its elements; they are contained in pages 51 and 52 of his article. And all this together is called "military science" in the singular. The process of integration of all sciences serves as substantiation for this. Reference is made to the prediction by K. Marx about the creation of a unified science by the year 2034, only the author says nothing about what will happen with military science and whether or not anything will be left of it.

We believe that it is impossible to encompass everything relating to war as an arch-difficult social phenomenon with the single concept "military science." It is possible that in a philosophical interpretation it is permissible to call the entire system of theories and sciences in military affairs by the one general concept "military science," but in practice such an eroded understanding of it generates inconsistency and discomfort. For example, the fact is that there is not just medical, agricultural or naval science. It is impossible to study and develop naval affairs without astronomy, navigation, mechanics, hydrodynamics and so on.

Military art, military topography, military administration, military cybernetics, military history, military pedagogics, military psychology and so on function together with a sphere of human endeavor such as military affairs. In this regard, it is in our view advisable to reject an expanded understanding of the essence of military science and the artificial inclusion in it of a number of other sciences studying military affairs as the unified concept "military science."

It shaped up historically that the content of military affairs expanded substantially while the form reflecting it remained unchanged. Therefore, in our view it is necessary to bring the form and content of military science into conformity. Scientific research should be actively continued in this direction.

#### Footnotes

1. VOYENNAYA MYSL, No 7, 1989, p 50.

#### Letter to the Editors

90UM0418M Moscow VOYENNAYA MYSL in Russian No 3, Mar 90 (signed to press 28 Feb 90) p 80—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Letter by Captain 2nd Rank V. F. Usikov]

[Text] For real democratization of higher military educational institutions it is necessary to make broader and more effective use of the rights of a school's academic council. Give it the right not only to recommend an instructor for an academic title or degree, but also to confer a qualification based on his scientific-pedagogic activity. In other words, issue a certificate, a working diploma, for the right to bear the title, for example, of Pedagogue 1st, 2nd or 3rd class.

If we compare scientific methodological work (elaboration of textbooks, training aids, training methods aids, scientific research and so on) in terms of percentages, then both "scientists" as well as "nonscientists" engage in it. Then just why does the concept exist that the end result of a school's activity—training specialists—depends basically on how many "scientists" are in the higher military educational institution?

#### To Readers and Authors

90UM0418N Moscow VOYENNAYA MYSL in Russian No 3, Mar 90 (signed to press 28 Feb 90) p C3—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Unattributed article]

[Text] In connection with the fact that the journal VOYENNAYA MYSL has become open for free subscription, the editors deem it necessary to make known certain recommendations and requirements for preparing materials being sent to them.

The range of journal writings is very broad, from research and information articles and scientific announcements to responses to articles, selections of

materials of different authors on the same subject, and reviews of new books. But any material which you send to the journal must be presented in a simple language understandable by every reader. It is inadvisable to oversaturate it with quotations and with complicated and specialized terminology. Clarity, substantiation and concreteness are required in presenting material. A theoretical article of a research nature should cover thoroughly argued views, draw conclusions and generalizations, give recommendations, and make wide use of calculations, charts and other substantiations. It is also very important that it contain elements of discussion and the author's theoretical quest.

It is advisable to prepare materials of writings not on a general and rather broad topic, but to choose and focus attention on narrower, more specific, poorly elaborated and controversial subjects. Only in this case can an article be current, have practical value, and be purposeful. Its content must be enriched by various statistical data, mathematical calculations, historical examples and other materials needed for substantiated conclusions and recommendations, but in all cases the actual data and quotations must be backed up by references to corresponding sources, and it is desirable that they be given here based on the latest editions of a particular work.

In sending an article to the editors it should also be borne in mind that its volume must not exceed 16-18 pages of double-spaced typewritten text in two copies. Hand-written material as a rule is not accepted for processing.

If these requirements are not observed, the editors have the right to refuse to accept the author's material.

In conclusion it should be emphasized that the quality of journal writings depends largely on the degree of creative collaboration of the editors with the group of authors and the readers. Their letters often contain much useful advice and many useful recommendations, critical comments and wishes which the editors take into account in their work. Strengthening this collaboration is an important factor in further improving the effectiveness and quality of materials published in the pages of VOYENNAYA MYSL.

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